[SOLVED] On a fateful day in 2001, a

On a fateful day in 2001, a GM engineer realized during preproduction testing of the Saturn Ion that there was a defect that caused the small car’s engine to stall with- out warning.1 This switch was approved in 2002 by an engineer, Raymond DiGeorgio, who said he knew the switch was substandard, but “he did not think it could endanger lives.”2 The defect—that would allow the switch to disengage when a heavy key- chain was jiggled by a knee or a pothole— was discovered again when the Chevrolet Cobalt replaced the Chevrolet Cavalier in 2004,3 but GM apparently did not realize the full significance of the problem until late 20134—that the defect would disable the car’s power-assisted steering, brakes, and airbags, and over 150 people would die as a result. How could this happen at one of the world’s largest carmakers?
When the engine stops in a car equipped with power steering and brakes, the driver suddenly has to exert almost superhuman strength to turn the car or to stop it, and the airbags may not work. When a moving car stalls without warning, the driver instantly finds that she or he is driving the equivalent of a block of concrete on wheels. Even if the driver is not stunned by the transition, the direction of the car and its speed often cannot be controlled by a person of normal strength. Even abnormal strength cannot activate airbags if they are electronically enabled, which GM’s were. The driver and passengers usually just have to go wherever the car is headed without the protection of brakes and airbags. No wonder many people died or were injured.
In March 2005, GM rejected fixing the ignition switch because “it would be too costly and take too long.”5 Instead, GM sent a bulletin to its dealers warning that the ignition switch could fail when “the driver is short and has a large and/or heavy key chain … the customer should be advised of this potential and should … [remove] unessential items from their key chain.”6 Later estimates would place the cost of the fix at 57 cents per switch.7
However, a GM engineer, Raymond DiGeorgio, did redesign the switch in 2006, but did not change the part number, which was “very unusual” 8 and against GM policy.9 Nor did he tell any- one.10 The redesigned switch apparently solved the problem in some cars built after 2006, but since the part number was not changed, National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA) investigators in 2007 and 2010 did not discover the link between the faulty switch and the crashes and deaths.11 Later, in 2016, GM admitted that these redesigned switches still didn’t meet their minimum standards so cars produced between 2008-2011 were also defective.12
By the time the subprime lending crisis became a reality in 2007–2008, GM was in financial difficulty and was in need of a bail- out, as were some other auto makers, to pre- serve the jobs of their employees as well as those of their suppliers. Part of GM’s recovery plan involved it going into bankruptcy, and emerging as a “new” GM to allow it to shed it liabilities as at June 1, 2009, including some of the liabilities to people injured due to the faulty ignition switches.13
When the full fury of the public and out- raged lawmakers surfaced in 2014, the GM Board of Directors commissioned a report by Anton R. Valukas, who had earlier been called upon to investigate the Enron scandal. His 325 page report, dated May 29, 2014, provides many details about the individuals and processes involved in this tragedy.14 One of the observations made concerned GM’s method for dealing with difficult issues like the faulty ignition switch. He reported:
While GM heard over and over from various quarters including custom- ers, dealers, the press, and their own
employees—that the car’s ignition switch led to moving stalls, group after group, committee after committee with GM that reviewed the issue failed to take action, or acted too slowly. Although everyone had responsibility to fix the problem, nobody took responsibility. It was an example of what one top executive described as the “GM nod,” when everyone nods in agreement to a proposed plan of action, but then leaves the room and does nothing.
In January 2014, Mary Barra became the CEO of GM. She learned of the faulty ignition switch on January 31, 2014. Since that time, she has had to steer GM through the crisis, the lawsuits, the public hearings, and the recall of millions of cars. Even with the 2008 bankruptcy, GM faced lawsuits of approximately $1 billion15 and refit costs of hundreds of millions of dollars, not to mention dealing with the loss of reputation and future sales. For her role in leading the company in 2014, Mary was paid a “base salary of $1.6m, and granted stock awards worth more than $13.7m that she cannot cash in for several years.”16
Questions
1. Why didn’t GM act effectively on suspicions that their ignition switches were faulty?
2. Who was at fault for the deaths and injuries involved, and why?
3. Should a company be able to escape liability for harming individuals by declaring bankruptcy?
4. Should any GM personnel go to jail over the ignition switch failures? If so, whom.
5. Would you trust GM enough to buy one of their cars in the future?
6. Was Mary Barra paid enough for the job she was required to do?

Question: On a fateful day in 2001, a