[SOLVED] In the Language of the Court; Driving

In the Language of the Court;
Driving that train, high on cocaine, Casey Jones you better watch your speed. Trouble ahead, trouble behind, and you know that notion just crossed my mind. The Grateful Dead, Casey Jones, on Workingman’s Dead (Warner Bros. Records 1970). Although the record of the present case does not reflect a comparable level of drama as captured by the refrain of “Casey Jones,” it hints at plenty of potential trouble, both ahead and behind, for a pair of public works projects (one in place and the other incipient [in development]) cherished by the government and some citizens of Montgomery County.
The Capital Crescent Trail is a well-known hiker/biker route that runs between Georgetown in the District of Columbia and Silver Spring, Maryland. Its path was used formerly as the Georgetown Branch of the Baltimore & Ohio (B&O) Railroad. After the trains stopped running in 1985, the property was transferred in 1988 to the government of Montgomery County, Maryland, via a quitclaim deed for a consideration of $10 million. It is planned that the Maryland portion of the former rail line (and current interim hiker/biker trail) will become the proposed Purple Line, a commuter light rail project.
BACKGROUND:
Ajay Bhatt owns 3313 Coquelin Terrace (a subdivided, single-family residential lot— “Lot 8”—improved by a dwelling) in Chevy Chase, Montgomery County, Maryland. He purchased this property in 2006 from his aunt, who owned the property since at least the 1970s. The lot abuts the Georgetown Branch of the B&O Railroad/Capital Crescent Trail. In 1890, the right of-way that was the rail line (and is today the hiker/biker trail) was conveyed in a fee-simple deed from George Dunlop, grantor, to the Metropolitan Southern Railroad Company (“the Railroad”), grantee. The right-of-way was obtained by the County from the Railroad pursuant to the federal Rails-to-Trails Act. [Federal regulations] allow the County to preserve the land as a hiker/biker trail until the County chooses whether and when to restore a form of rail service within the right-of-way.
On 18 October 2013, Montgomery County issued to Bhatt a civil citation asserting a violation of Section 49-10(b) of the Montgomery County Code, which prohibits a property owner from erecting or placing “any structure, fence, post, rock, or other object in a public right-of-way.” The claimed violation was the placement and maintenance by Bhatt’s predecessors-in-interest of Lot 8 of a fence and shed within the former rail line (and current hiker/biker trail) right-of-way, without a permit. The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County, found Bhatt guilty and ordered him to remove the fence and shed encroaching upon the County’s right-of-way. The appeal was heard de novo by the [Maryland] Circuit Court. [When a court hears a case de novo, it decides the issues without reference to the legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous court.] Bhatt’s defence to the charged violation of Section 49–10(b) was that he owned the encroached-upon land by adverse possession. Bhatt argued that, because the fence had been located beyond the property line of Lot 8 since at least 1963, the Railroad was obliged to take action to remove it prior to the maturation of the twenty-year period for adverse possession.
The Circuit Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and dismissed the violation citation. The Circuit Court concluded ultimately that Bhatt had a creditable claim for adverse possession. The County petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted the Petition.
DISCUSSION:
I. Contentions:
The County contends that, because this Court has considered previously a railroad line to be analogous to a public highway for most purposes, the land in question is not subject to an adverse possession claim. Bhatt rejects the public highway railroad line analogy because the land was in private, not public, use during its operation as a rail line.
II. Analysis:
a. Railroads as Public Highways A railroad is in many essential respects a public highway, and the rules of law applicable to one are generally applicable to the other. Railroads are owned frequently by private corporations, but this has never been considered a matter of any importance because the function performed is that of the State. Railroad companies operate as a public use and are not viewed strictly as private corporations since they are publicly regulated common carriers. Essentially, a railroad is a highway dedicated to the public use. [Emphasis added.]
b. May a public highway (or any portion of its right-of-way, no matter the type of real property interest by which it is held) be possessed adversely by an abutting private citizen? Nothing is more solidly established than the rule that title to property held by a municipal corporation in its governmental capacity, for a public use, cannot be acquired by adverse possession. [Emphasis added.] Because time does not run against the state, or the public, public highways are not subject to a claim for adverse possession, except in the limited circumstances of a clear abandonment by the State. By parity [equivalence] of reasoning applied to the present case, railway lines [are] also not subject to a claim for adverse possession, without evidence of clear abandonment or a clear shift away from public use.
c. Use of the right-of-way We do not find in this record, however, that there is any evidence of abandonment by the rail line operator (or Montgomery County) or that the right-of-way was taken out of public use such that a claim for adverse possession could ripen within this right-of-way.
The 1890 Dunlop Deed shows that the purchase made by the Railroad was from a private landowner. There was no evidence adduced [offered] by Bhatt supporting a conclusion that the right-of-way was abandoned and was not being used by the public, even during the period from 1985 when the freight service ended and 1988 when the property was conveyed to the County and became a hiker/ biker trail as an interim public use. Because no evidence was presented by Bhatt to show that the current use of the right-of-way by Montgomery County is unreasonable or that the Railroad or the County abandoned the right-of-way, no claim for adverse possession will lie. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court. Bhatt’s fence and shed encroached upon the right of-way in violation of Montgomery County Code Section 49–10(b). The District Court got it right.
Legal Reasoning Questions
1. Bhatt claimed to have met all of the requirements to acquire a strip of public land through adverse possession. Which element did the court find had not been met? Why?
2. What is the “potential trouble, both ahead and behind, for a pair of public works projects” hinted at in this case? In whose favour is that “trouble” likely to be resolved?
3. Should a private party, by encroaching on a public right-of-way, be able to acquire title adverse to the public rights? Discuss.

Question: In the Language of the Court; Driving