[SOLVED] The respondents are two Delaware corporations:

The respondents are two Delaware corporations: Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) and its subsidiary, Aramco Service Company (ASC). Aramco’s principal place of business is Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and it is licensed to do business in Texas.
In 1979, Boureslan was hired by ASC as a cost engineer in Houston. A year later, he was transferred, at his request, to work for Aramco in Saudi Arabia. Boureslan remained with Aramco in Saudi Arabia until he was discharged in 1984. He instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against Aramco and ASC. He sought relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act on the ground that he was harassed and ultimately discharged by respondents on account of his race, religion, and national origin.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
Both parties concede, as they must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Whether Congress has in fact exercised that authority in this case is a matter of statutory construction. It is our task to determine whether Congress intended the protections of Title VII to apply to United States citizens employed by American employers outside of the United States.
It is a long-standing principle of American law “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” It serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.
Title VII prohibits various discriminatory employment practices based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. An employer is subject to Title VII if it is “engaged in an industry affecting commerce.” “Commerce,” in turn, is defined as “trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof… .”
Petitioners … assert that since Title VII defines “States” to include States, the District of Columbia, and specified territories, the clause “between a State and any place outside thereof” must be referring to areas beyond the territorial limit of the United States. The language relied upon by petitioners—and it is they who must make the affirmative showing—is ambiguous, and does not speak directly to the question presented here. The intent of Congress as to the extraterritorial application of this statute must be deduced by inference from boilerplate language which can be found in any number of congressional acts, none of which have ever been held to apply overseas. If we were to permit possible, or even plausible, interpretations of language such as that involved here to override the presumption against extraterritorial application, there would be little left of the presumption Petitioners argue that Title VII’s “alien exemption provision … clearly manifests an intention” by Congress to protect U.S. citizens with respect to their employment outside of the United States. The alien exemption provision says that “the statute” shall not apply to an employer with……………

Required:
1. Is it the presumption that a federal law will or will not have extraterritorial application if not otherwise stated?
2. What type of a legal analysis did the court apply— literal construction or contextual construction?
3. In light of immediate, subsequent action by Congress, did it appear that the statute had accurately reflected (and the court had iterated) Congress’s intent?

Question: The respondents are two Delaware corporations: