2.99 See Answer

Question: One of the earliest frauds during the

One of the earliest frauds during the late 1990s and early 2000s was at Sunbeam. The SEC alleged in its charges against Sunbeam that top management engaged in a scheme to fraudulently misrepresent Sunbeam’s operating results in connection with a purported “turnaround” of the company. When Sunbeam’s turnaround was exposed as a sham, the stock price plummeted, causing investors billions of dollars in losses. The defendants in the action included Sunbeam’s former CEO and chair Albert J. Dunlap, former principal financial officer Russell A. Kersh, former controller Robert J. Gluck, former vice presidents Donald R. Uzzi and Lee B. Griffith, and Arthur Andersen LLP partner Phillip Harlow. The SEC complaint described several questionable management decisions and fraudulent actions that led to the manipulation of financial statement amounts in the company’s 1996 year-end results, quarterly and year-end 1997 results, and the first quarter of 1998. The fraud was enabled by weak or nonexistent internal controls, inadequate or nonexistent board of directors and audit committee oversight, and the failure of the Andersen auditor to follow GAAS. The following is an excerpt from the SEC’s AAER 1393, issued on May 15, 2001: From the last quarter of 1996 until June 1998, Sunbeam Corporation’s senior management created the illusion of a successful restructuring of Sunbeam in order to inflate its stock price and thus improve its value as an acquisition target. To this end, management employed numerous improper earnings management techniques to falsify the Company’s results and conceal its deteriorating financial condition. Specifically, senior management created $35 million in improper restructuring reserves and other “cookie-jar” reserves as part of a year-end 1996 restructuring, which were reversed into income the following year. Also, in 1997, Sunbeam’s management engaged in guaranteed sales, improper “bill-and-hold” sales, and other fraudulent practices. At year-end 1997, at least $62 million of Sunbeam’s reported income of $189 million came from accounting fraud. The undisclosed or inadequately disclosed acceleration of sales through “channel-stuffing” also materially distorted the Company’s reported results of operations and contributed to the inaccurate picture of a successful turnaround. A brief summary of the case follows. Chainsaw Al Al Dunlap, a turnaround specialist who had gained the nickname “Chainsaw Al” for his reputation of cutting companies to the bone, was hired by Sunbeam’s board in July 1996 to restructure the financially ailing company. He promised a rapid turnaround, thereby raising expectations in the marketplace. The fraudulent actions helped raise the market price to a high of $52 in 1997. Following the disclosure of the fraud in the first quarter of 1998, the price of Sunbeam shares dropped by 25 percent, to $34.63. The price continued to decline as the board of directors investigated the fraud and fired Dunlap and the CFO. An extensive restatement of earnings from the fourth quarter of 1996 through the first quarter of 1998 eliminated half of the reported 1997 profits. On February 6, 2001, Sunbeam filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Accounting Issues Cookie-Jar Reserves The illegal conduct began in late 1996, with the creation of cookie-jar reserves that were used to inflate income in 1997. Sunbeam then engaged in fraudulent revenue transactions that inflated the company’s record-setting earnings of $189 million by at least $60 million in 1997. The transactions were designed to create the impression that Sunbeam was experiencing significant revenue growth, thereby further misleading the investors and financial markets. Sunbeam took a total restructuring charge of $337.6 million at year-end 1996. However, management padded this charge with at least $35 million in improper restructuring and other reserves and accruals, excessive write-downs, and prematurely recognized expenses that materially distorted the Company’s reported results of operations for fiscal year 1996 and would materially distort its reported results of operations in all quarters of fiscal year 1997, as these improper reserves were drawn into income. The most substantial contribution to Sunbeam’s improper reserves came from $18.7 million in 1996 restructuring costs that management knew or was reckless in not knowing were not in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Sunbeam also created a $12 million litigation reserve against its potential liability for an environmental remediation. However, this reserve amount was not established in conformity with GAAP and improperly overstated Sunbeam’s probable liability in that matter by at least $6 million. Channel Stuffing Eager to extend the selling season for its gas grills and to boost sales in 1996, CEO Dunlap’s “turnaround year,” the company tried to convince retailers to buy grills nearly six months before they were needed, in exchange for major discounts. Retailers agreed to purchase merchandise that they would not receive physically until six months after billing. In the meantime, the goods were shipped to a third-party warehouse and held there until the customers requested them. These bill-and-hold transactions led to recording $35 million in revenue too soon. However, the auditors (Andersen) reviewed the documents and reversed $29 million. In 1997, the company failed to disclose that Sunbeam’s 1997 revenue growth was partly achieved at the expense of future results. The company had offered discounts and other inducements to customers to sell merchandise immediately that otherwise would have been sold in later periods, a practice referred to as “channel stuffing.” The resulting revenue shift threatened to suppress Sunbeam’s future results of operations. Sunbeam either didn’t realize or totally ignored the fact that, by stuffing the channels with product to make one year look better, the company had to continue to find outlets for their product in advance of when it was desired by customers. In other words, it created a balloon effect, in that the same amount or more accelerated amount of revenue was needed year after year. Ultimately, Sunbeam (and its customers) just couldn’t keep up, and there was no way to fix the numbers. Sunbeam’s Shenanigans Exhibit 1 presents an analysis of Sunbeam’s accounting with respect to Schilit’s financial shenanigans.
One of the earliest frauds during the late 1990s and early 2000s was at Sunbeam. The SEC alleged in its charges against Sunbeam that top management engaged in a scheme to fraudulently misrepresent Sunbeam’s operating results in connection with a purported “turnaround” of the company. When Sunbeam’s turnaround was exposed as a sham, the stock price plummeted, causing investors billions of dollars in losses. The defendants in the action included Sunbeam’s former CEO and chair Albert J. Dunlap, former principal financial officer Russell A. Kersh, former controller Robert J. Gluck, former vice presidents Donald R. Uzzi and Lee B. Griffith, and Arthur Andersen LLP partner Phillip Harlow.
The SEC complaint described several questionable management decisions and fraudulent actions that led to the manipulation of financial statement amounts in the company’s 1996 year-end results, quarterly and year-end 1997 results, and the first quarter of 1998. The fraud was enabled by weak or nonexistent internal controls, inadequate or nonexistent board of directors and audit committee oversight, and the failure of the Andersen auditor to follow GAAS. The following is an excerpt from the SEC’s AAER 1393, issued on May 15, 2001:
From the last quarter of 1996 until June 1998, Sunbeam Corporation’s senior management created the illusion of a successful restructuring of Sunbeam in order to inflate its stock price and thus improve its value as an acquisition target. To this end, management employed numerous improper earnings management techniques to falsify the Company’s results and conceal its deteriorating financial condition. Specifically, senior management created $35 million in improper restructuring reserves and other “cookie-jar” reserves as part of a year-end 1996 restructuring, which were reversed into income the following year. Also, in 1997, Sunbeam’s management engaged in guaranteed sales, improper “bill-and-hold” sales, and other fraudulent practices. At year-end 1997, at least $62 million of Sunbeam’s reported income of $189 million came from accounting fraud. The undisclosed or inadequately disclosed acceleration of sales through “channel-stuffing” also materially distorted the Company’s reported results of operations and contributed to the inaccurate picture of a successful turnaround. 
A brief summary of the case follows. 
Chainsaw Al
Al Dunlap, a turnaround specialist who had gained the nickname “Chainsaw Al” for his reputation of cutting companies to the bone, was hired by Sunbeam’s board in July 1996 to restructure the financially ailing company. He promised a rapid turnaround, thereby raising expectations in the marketplace. The fraudulent actions helped raise the market price to a high of $52 in 1997. Following the disclosure of the fraud in the first quarter of 1998, the price of Sunbeam shares dropped by 25 percent, to $34.63. The price continued to decline as the board of directors investigated the fraud and fired Dunlap and the CFO. An extensive restatement of earnings from the fourth quarter of 1996 through the first quarter of 1998 eliminated half of the reported 1997 profits. On February 6, 2001, Sunbeam filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
Accounting Issues
Cookie-Jar Reserves
The illegal conduct began in late 1996, with the creation of cookie-jar reserves that were used to inflate income in 1997. Sunbeam then engaged in fraudulent revenue transactions that inflated the company’s record-setting earnings of $189 million by at least $60 million in 1997. The transactions were designed to create the impression that Sunbeam was experiencing significant revenue growth, thereby further misleading the investors and financial markets.
Sunbeam took a total restructuring charge of $337.6 million at year-end 1996. However, management padded this charge with at least $35 million in improper restructuring and other reserves and accruals, excessive write-downs, and prematurely recognized expenses that materially distorted the Company’s reported results of operations for fiscal year 1996 and would materially distort its reported results of operations in all quarters of fiscal year 1997, as these improper reserves were drawn into income. 
The most substantial contribution to Sunbeam’s improper reserves came from $18.7 million in 1996 restructuring costs that management knew or was reckless in not knowing were not in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Sunbeam also created a $12 million litigation reserve against its potential liability for an environmental remediation. However, this reserve amount was not established in conformity with GAAP and improperly overstated Sunbeam’s probable liability in that matter by at least $6 million. 
Channel Stuffing
Eager to extend the selling season for its gas grills and to boost sales in 1996, CEO Dunlap’s “turnaround year,” the company tried to convince retailers to buy grills nearly six months before they were needed, in exchange for major discounts. Retailers agreed to purchase merchandise that they would not receive physically until six months after billing. In the meantime, the goods were shipped to a third-party warehouse and held there until the customers requested them. These bill-and-hold transactions led to recording $35 million in revenue too soon. However, the auditors (Andersen) reviewed the documents and reversed $29 million.
In 1997, the company failed to disclose that Sunbeam’s 1997 revenue growth was partly achieved at the expense of future results. The company had offered discounts and other inducements to customers to sell merchandise immediately that otherwise would have been sold in later periods, a practice referred to as “channel stuffing.” The resulting revenue shift threatened to suppress Sunbeam’s future results of operations.
Sunbeam either didn’t realize or totally ignored the fact that, by stuffing the channels with product to make one year look better, the company had to continue to find outlets for their product in advance of when it was desired by customers. In other words, it created a balloon effect, in that the same amount or more accelerated amount of revenue was needed year after year. Ultimately, Sunbeam (and its customers) just couldn’t keep up, and there was no way to fix the numbers.
Sunbeam’s Shenanigans
Exhibit 1 presents an analysis of Sunbeam’s accounting with respect to Schilit’s financial shenanigans.
Red Flags
Schilit points to several red flags that existed at Sunbeam but either went undetected or were ignored by Andersen, including the following: 
1. Excessive charges recorded shortly after Dunlap arrived. The theory is that an incoming CEO will create cookie-jar reserves by overstating expenses, even though it reduces earnings for the first year, based on the belief that increases in future earnings through the release of the reserves or other techniques make it appear that the CEO has turned the company around, as evidenced by turning losses into profits. Some companies might take it to an extreme and pile on losses by creating reserves in a loss year, believing that it doesn’t matter whether you show a $1.2 million loss for the year or a $1.8 million loss ($0.6 million reserve). This is known as “big-bath accounting.”
2. Reserve amounts reduced after initial overstatement. Fluctuations in the reserve amount should have raised a red flag because they evidenced earnings management as initially recorded reserves were restored into net income.
3. Receivables grew much faster than sales. A simple ratio of the increase in receivables to the increase in revenues should have provided another warning signal. Schilit provides the following for Sunbeam’s operational performance in Exhibit 2 that should have created doubts in the minds of the auditors about the accuracy of reported revenue amounts in relation to the collectability of receivables, as indicated by the significantly larger percentage increase in receivables compared to revenues.
4. Accrual earnings increased much faster than cash from operating activities. While Sunbeam made $189 million in 1997, its cash flow from operating activities was a negative $60.8 million. This is a $250 million difference that should raise a red flag, even under a cursory analytical review about the quality of recorded receivables. Accrual earnings and cash flow from operating activity amounts are not expected to be equal, but the differential in these amounts at Sunbeam seems to defy logic. Financial analysts tend to rely on the cash figure because of the inherent unreliability of the estimates and judgments that go into determining accrual earnings.
Quality of Earnings
No one transaction more than the following illustrates questions about the quality of earnings at Sunbeam. Sunbeam owned a lot of spare parts that were used to fix its blenders and grills when they broke. Those parts were stored in the warehouse of a company called EPI Printers, which sent the parts out as needed. To inflate profits, Sunbeam approached EPI at the end of December 1997, to sell it parts for $11 million (and book a $5 million profit). EPI balked, stating that the parts were worth only $2 million, but Sunbeam found a way around that. EPI was persuaded to sign an “agreement to agree” to buy the parts for $11 million, with a clause letting EPI walk away in January 1998. In fact, the parts were never sold, but the profit was posted anyway.
Along came Phillip E. Harlow, the Arthur Andersen managing partner in charge of the Sunbeam audit. He concluded the profit was not allowed under GAAP. Sunbeam agreed to cut it by $3 million but would go no further. Harlow could have said that if such a spurious profit were included, he would not sign off on the audit. But he took a different tack. He decided that the remaining profit was not material. Since the audit opinion says the financial statements “present fairly, in all material respects” the company financial position, he could sign off on them. The part that was not presented fairly was not material. And so, it did not matter.
Dunlap tries to Quiet the Markets . . . and the Board
Paine Webber, Inc., analyst Andrew Shore had been following Sunbeam since the day Dunlap was hired. As an analyst, Shore’s job was to make educated guesses about investing clients’ money in stocks. Thus, he had been scrutinizing Sunbeam’s financial statements every quarter and considered Sunbeam’s reported levels of inventory for certain items to be unusual for the time of year. For example, he noted massive increases in the sales of electric blankets in the third quarter of 1997, although they usually sell well in the fourth quarter. He also observed that sales of grills were high in the fourth quarter, which is an unusual time of year for grills to be sold and noted that accounts receivable were high. On April 3, 1998, just hours before Sunbeam announced a first-quarter loss of $44.6 million, Shore downgraded his assessment of the stock. By the end of the day, Sunbeam’s stock prices had fallen 25 percent.
Dunlap continued to run Sunbeam as if nothing had happened. On May 11, 1998, he tried to reassure 200 major investors and Wall Street analysts that the first quarter loss would not be repeated and that Sunbeam would post increased earnings in the second quarter. It didn’t work. The press continued to report on Sunbeams’ bill-and-hold strategy and the accounting practices that Dunlap had allegedly used to artificially inflate revenues and profits.
Dunlap called an unscheduled board meeting to address the reported charges on June 9, 1998. Harlow assured the board that the company’s 1997 numbers were in compliance with accounting standards and firmly stood by the firm’s audit of Sunbeam’s financial statements. As the meeting progressed the board directly asked Sunbeam if the company would make its projected second quarter earnings. His response that sales were soft concerned the board. A comprehensive review was ordered and eventually Dunlap was fired after the directors said they had “lost confidence” in his leadership. Sunbeam employees reportedly cheered the move openly when it was announced.
Settlement with Andersen
Harlow authorized unqualified audit opinions on Sunbeam’s 1996 and 1997 financial statements although he was aware of many of the company’s accounting improprieties and disclosure failures. These opinions were false and misleading in that, among other things, they incorrectly stated that Andersen had conducted an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and that the company’s financial statements fairly represented Sunbeam’s results and were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. In 2002, the SEC resolved a legal action against Andersen when a federal judge approved a $141 million settlement in the case. Andersen agreed to pay $110 million to resolve the claims without admitting fault or liability. In the end, losses to Sunbeam shareholders amounted to about $4.4 billion, with job losses of about 1,700. 
Questions.
1. Explain the accounting techniques used by Sunbeam to manage its earnings.
2. How did pressures for financial performance contribute to Sunbeam’s culture, where quarterly sales were manipulated to influence investors? To what extent do you believe the Andersen auditors should have considered the resulting culture in planning and executing its audit?
3. Why is it important for auditors to use analytical comparisons such as the ratios in the Sunbeam case to evaluate possible red flags that may indicate additional auditing is required? How does making such calculations enable auditors to meet their ethical obligations?

Red Flags Schilit points to several red flags that existed at Sunbeam but either went undetected or were ignored by Andersen, including the following: 1. Excessive charges recorded shortly after Dunlap arrived. The theory is that an incoming CEO will create cookie-jar reserves by overstating expenses, even though it reduces earnings for the first year, based on the belief that increases in future earnings through the release of the reserves or other techniques make it appear that the CEO has turned the company around, as evidenced by turning losses into profits. Some companies might take it to an extreme and pile on losses by creating reserves in a loss year, believing that it doesn’t matter whether you show a $1.2 million loss for the year or a $1.8 million loss ($0.6 million reserve). This is known as “big-bath accounting.” 2. Reserve amounts reduced after initial overstatement. Fluctuations in the reserve amount should have raised a red flag because they evidenced earnings management as initially recorded reserves were restored into net income. 3. Receivables grew much faster than sales. A simple ratio of the increase in receivables to the increase in revenues should have provided another warning signal. Schilit provides the following for Sunbeam’s operational performance in Exhibit 2 that should have created doubts in the minds of the auditors about the accuracy of reported revenue amounts in relation to the collectability of receivables, as indicated by the significantly larger percentage increase in receivables compared to revenues.
One of the earliest frauds during the late 1990s and early 2000s was at Sunbeam. The SEC alleged in its charges against Sunbeam that top management engaged in a scheme to fraudulently misrepresent Sunbeam’s operating results in connection with a purported “turnaround” of the company. When Sunbeam’s turnaround was exposed as a sham, the stock price plummeted, causing investors billions of dollars in losses. The defendants in the action included Sunbeam’s former CEO and chair Albert J. Dunlap, former principal financial officer Russell A. Kersh, former controller Robert J. Gluck, former vice presidents Donald R. Uzzi and Lee B. Griffith, and Arthur Andersen LLP partner Phillip Harlow.
The SEC complaint described several questionable management decisions and fraudulent actions that led to the manipulation of financial statement amounts in the company’s 1996 year-end results, quarterly and year-end 1997 results, and the first quarter of 1998. The fraud was enabled by weak or nonexistent internal controls, inadequate or nonexistent board of directors and audit committee oversight, and the failure of the Andersen auditor to follow GAAS. The following is an excerpt from the SEC’s AAER 1393, issued on May 15, 2001:
From the last quarter of 1996 until June 1998, Sunbeam Corporation’s senior management created the illusion of a successful restructuring of Sunbeam in order to inflate its stock price and thus improve its value as an acquisition target. To this end, management employed numerous improper earnings management techniques to falsify the Company’s results and conceal its deteriorating financial condition. Specifically, senior management created $35 million in improper restructuring reserves and other “cookie-jar” reserves as part of a year-end 1996 restructuring, which were reversed into income the following year. Also, in 1997, Sunbeam’s management engaged in guaranteed sales, improper “bill-and-hold” sales, and other fraudulent practices. At year-end 1997, at least $62 million of Sunbeam’s reported income of $189 million came from accounting fraud. The undisclosed or inadequately disclosed acceleration of sales through “channel-stuffing” also materially distorted the Company’s reported results of operations and contributed to the inaccurate picture of a successful turnaround. 
A brief summary of the case follows. 
Chainsaw Al
Al Dunlap, a turnaround specialist who had gained the nickname “Chainsaw Al” for his reputation of cutting companies to the bone, was hired by Sunbeam’s board in July 1996 to restructure the financially ailing company. He promised a rapid turnaround, thereby raising expectations in the marketplace. The fraudulent actions helped raise the market price to a high of $52 in 1997. Following the disclosure of the fraud in the first quarter of 1998, the price of Sunbeam shares dropped by 25 percent, to $34.63. The price continued to decline as the board of directors investigated the fraud and fired Dunlap and the CFO. An extensive restatement of earnings from the fourth quarter of 1996 through the first quarter of 1998 eliminated half of the reported 1997 profits. On February 6, 2001, Sunbeam filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
Accounting Issues
Cookie-Jar Reserves
The illegal conduct began in late 1996, with the creation of cookie-jar reserves that were used to inflate income in 1997. Sunbeam then engaged in fraudulent revenue transactions that inflated the company’s record-setting earnings of $189 million by at least $60 million in 1997. The transactions were designed to create the impression that Sunbeam was experiencing significant revenue growth, thereby further misleading the investors and financial markets.
Sunbeam took a total restructuring charge of $337.6 million at year-end 1996. However, management padded this charge with at least $35 million in improper restructuring and other reserves and accruals, excessive write-downs, and prematurely recognized expenses that materially distorted the Company’s reported results of operations for fiscal year 1996 and would materially distort its reported results of operations in all quarters of fiscal year 1997, as these improper reserves were drawn into income. 
The most substantial contribution to Sunbeam’s improper reserves came from $18.7 million in 1996 restructuring costs that management knew or was reckless in not knowing were not in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. Sunbeam also created a $12 million litigation reserve against its potential liability for an environmental remediation. However, this reserve amount was not established in conformity with GAAP and improperly overstated Sunbeam’s probable liability in that matter by at least $6 million. 
Channel Stuffing
Eager to extend the selling season for its gas grills and to boost sales in 1996, CEO Dunlap’s “turnaround year,” the company tried to convince retailers to buy grills nearly six months before they were needed, in exchange for major discounts. Retailers agreed to purchase merchandise that they would not receive physically until six months after billing. In the meantime, the goods were shipped to a third-party warehouse and held there until the customers requested them. These bill-and-hold transactions led to recording $35 million in revenue too soon. However, the auditors (Andersen) reviewed the documents and reversed $29 million.
In 1997, the company failed to disclose that Sunbeam’s 1997 revenue growth was partly achieved at the expense of future results. The company had offered discounts and other inducements to customers to sell merchandise immediately that otherwise would have been sold in later periods, a practice referred to as “channel stuffing.” The resulting revenue shift threatened to suppress Sunbeam’s future results of operations.
Sunbeam either didn’t realize or totally ignored the fact that, by stuffing the channels with product to make one year look better, the company had to continue to find outlets for their product in advance of when it was desired by customers. In other words, it created a balloon effect, in that the same amount or more accelerated amount of revenue was needed year after year. Ultimately, Sunbeam (and its customers) just couldn’t keep up, and there was no way to fix the numbers.
Sunbeam’s Shenanigans
Exhibit 1 presents an analysis of Sunbeam’s accounting with respect to Schilit’s financial shenanigans.
Red Flags
Schilit points to several red flags that existed at Sunbeam but either went undetected or were ignored by Andersen, including the following: 
1. Excessive charges recorded shortly after Dunlap arrived. The theory is that an incoming CEO will create cookie-jar reserves by overstating expenses, even though it reduces earnings for the first year, based on the belief that increases in future earnings through the release of the reserves or other techniques make it appear that the CEO has turned the company around, as evidenced by turning losses into profits. Some companies might take it to an extreme and pile on losses by creating reserves in a loss year, believing that it doesn’t matter whether you show a $1.2 million loss for the year or a $1.8 million loss ($0.6 million reserve). This is known as “big-bath accounting.”
2. Reserve amounts reduced after initial overstatement. Fluctuations in the reserve amount should have raised a red flag because they evidenced earnings management as initially recorded reserves were restored into net income.
3. Receivables grew much faster than sales. A simple ratio of the increase in receivables to the increase in revenues should have provided another warning signal. Schilit provides the following for Sunbeam’s operational performance in Exhibit 2 that should have created doubts in the minds of the auditors about the accuracy of reported revenue amounts in relation to the collectability of receivables, as indicated by the significantly larger percentage increase in receivables compared to revenues.
4. Accrual earnings increased much faster than cash from operating activities. While Sunbeam made $189 million in 1997, its cash flow from operating activities was a negative $60.8 million. This is a $250 million difference that should raise a red flag, even under a cursory analytical review about the quality of recorded receivables. Accrual earnings and cash flow from operating activity amounts are not expected to be equal, but the differential in these amounts at Sunbeam seems to defy logic. Financial analysts tend to rely on the cash figure because of the inherent unreliability of the estimates and judgments that go into determining accrual earnings.
Quality of Earnings
No one transaction more than the following illustrates questions about the quality of earnings at Sunbeam. Sunbeam owned a lot of spare parts that were used to fix its blenders and grills when they broke. Those parts were stored in the warehouse of a company called EPI Printers, which sent the parts out as needed. To inflate profits, Sunbeam approached EPI at the end of December 1997, to sell it parts for $11 million (and book a $5 million profit). EPI balked, stating that the parts were worth only $2 million, but Sunbeam found a way around that. EPI was persuaded to sign an “agreement to agree” to buy the parts for $11 million, with a clause letting EPI walk away in January 1998. In fact, the parts were never sold, but the profit was posted anyway.
Along came Phillip E. Harlow, the Arthur Andersen managing partner in charge of the Sunbeam audit. He concluded the profit was not allowed under GAAP. Sunbeam agreed to cut it by $3 million but would go no further. Harlow could have said that if such a spurious profit were included, he would not sign off on the audit. But he took a different tack. He decided that the remaining profit was not material. Since the audit opinion says the financial statements “present fairly, in all material respects” the company financial position, he could sign off on them. The part that was not presented fairly was not material. And so, it did not matter.
Dunlap tries to Quiet the Markets . . . and the Board
Paine Webber, Inc., analyst Andrew Shore had been following Sunbeam since the day Dunlap was hired. As an analyst, Shore’s job was to make educated guesses about investing clients’ money in stocks. Thus, he had been scrutinizing Sunbeam’s financial statements every quarter and considered Sunbeam’s reported levels of inventory for certain items to be unusual for the time of year. For example, he noted massive increases in the sales of electric blankets in the third quarter of 1997, although they usually sell well in the fourth quarter. He also observed that sales of grills were high in the fourth quarter, which is an unusual time of year for grills to be sold and noted that accounts receivable were high. On April 3, 1998, just hours before Sunbeam announced a first-quarter loss of $44.6 million, Shore downgraded his assessment of the stock. By the end of the day, Sunbeam’s stock prices had fallen 25 percent.
Dunlap continued to run Sunbeam as if nothing had happened. On May 11, 1998, he tried to reassure 200 major investors and Wall Street analysts that the first quarter loss would not be repeated and that Sunbeam would post increased earnings in the second quarter. It didn’t work. The press continued to report on Sunbeams’ bill-and-hold strategy and the accounting practices that Dunlap had allegedly used to artificially inflate revenues and profits.
Dunlap called an unscheduled board meeting to address the reported charges on June 9, 1998. Harlow assured the board that the company’s 1997 numbers were in compliance with accounting standards and firmly stood by the firm’s audit of Sunbeam’s financial statements. As the meeting progressed the board directly asked Sunbeam if the company would make its projected second quarter earnings. His response that sales were soft concerned the board. A comprehensive review was ordered and eventually Dunlap was fired after the directors said they had “lost confidence” in his leadership. Sunbeam employees reportedly cheered the move openly when it was announced.
Settlement with Andersen
Harlow authorized unqualified audit opinions on Sunbeam’s 1996 and 1997 financial statements although he was aware of many of the company’s accounting improprieties and disclosure failures. These opinions were false and misleading in that, among other things, they incorrectly stated that Andersen had conducted an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and that the company’s financial statements fairly represented Sunbeam’s results and were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. In 2002, the SEC resolved a legal action against Andersen when a federal judge approved a $141 million settlement in the case. Andersen agreed to pay $110 million to resolve the claims without admitting fault or liability. In the end, losses to Sunbeam shareholders amounted to about $4.4 billion, with job losses of about 1,700. 
Questions.
1. Explain the accounting techniques used by Sunbeam to manage its earnings.
2. How did pressures for financial performance contribute to Sunbeam’s culture, where quarterly sales were manipulated to influence investors? To what extent do you believe the Andersen auditors should have considered the resulting culture in planning and executing its audit?
3. Why is it important for auditors to use analytical comparisons such as the ratios in the Sunbeam case to evaluate possible red flags that may indicate additional auditing is required? How does making such calculations enable auditors to meet their ethical obligations?

4. Accrual earnings increased much faster than cash from operating activities. While Sunbeam made $189 million in 1997, its cash flow from operating activities was a negative $60.8 million. This is a $250 million difference that should raise a red flag, even under a cursory analytical review about the quality of recorded receivables. Accrual earnings and cash flow from operating activity amounts are not expected to be equal, but the differential in these amounts at Sunbeam seems to defy logic. Financial analysts tend to rely on the cash figure because of the inherent unreliability of the estimates and judgments that go into determining accrual earnings. Quality of Earnings No one transaction more than the following illustrates questions about the quality of earnings at Sunbeam. Sunbeam owned a lot of spare parts that were used to fix its blenders and grills when they broke. Those parts were stored in the warehouse of a company called EPI Printers, which sent the parts out as needed. To inflate profits, Sunbeam approached EPI at the end of December 1997, to sell it parts for $11 million (and book a $5 million profit). EPI balked, stating that the parts were worth only $2 million, but Sunbeam found a way around that. EPI was persuaded to sign an “agreement to agree” to buy the parts for $11 million, with a clause letting EPI walk away in January 1998. In fact, the parts were never sold, but the profit was posted anyway. Along came Phillip E. Harlow, the Arthur Andersen managing partner in charge of the Sunbeam audit. He concluded the profit was not allowed under GAAP. Sunbeam agreed to cut it by $3 million but would go no further. Harlow could have said that if such a spurious profit were included, he would not sign off on the audit. But he took a different tack. He decided that the remaining profit was not material. Since the audit opinion says the financial statements “present fairly, in all material respects” the company financial position, he could sign off on them. The part that was not presented fairly was not material. And so, it did not matter. Dunlap tries to Quiet the Markets . . . and the Board Paine Webber, Inc., analyst Andrew Shore had been following Sunbeam since the day Dunlap was hired. As an analyst, Shore’s job was to make educated guesses about investing clients’ money in stocks. Thus, he had been scrutinizing Sunbeam’s financial statements every quarter and considered Sunbeam’s reported levels of inventory for certain items to be unusual for the time of year. For example, he noted massive increases in the sales of electric blankets in the third quarter of 1997, although they usually sell well in the fourth quarter. He also observed that sales of grills were high in the fourth quarter, which is an unusual time of year for grills to be sold and noted that accounts receivable were high. On April 3, 1998, just hours before Sunbeam announced a first-quarter loss of $44.6 million, Shore downgraded his assessment of the stock. By the end of the day, Sunbeam’s stock prices had fallen 25 percent. Dunlap continued to run Sunbeam as if nothing had happened. On May 11, 1998, he tried to reassure 200 major investors and Wall Street analysts that the first quarter loss would not be repeated and that Sunbeam would post increased earnings in the second quarter. It didn’t work. The press continued to report on Sunbeams’ bill-and-hold strategy and the accounting practices that Dunlap had allegedly used to artificially inflate revenues and profits. Dunlap called an unscheduled board meeting to address the reported charges on June 9, 1998. Harlow assured the board that the company’s 1997 numbers were in compliance with accounting standards and firmly stood by the firm’s audit of Sunbeam’s financial statements. As the meeting progressed the board directly asked Sunbeam if the company would make its projected second quarter earnings. His response that sales were soft concerned the board. A comprehensive review was ordered and eventually Dunlap was fired after the directors said they had “lost confidence” in his leadership. Sunbeam employees reportedly cheered the move openly when it was announced. Settlement with Andersen Harlow authorized unqualified audit opinions on Sunbeam’s 1996 and 1997 financial statements although he was aware of many of the company’s accounting improprieties and disclosure failures. These opinions were false and misleading in that, among other things, they incorrectly stated that Andersen had conducted an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and that the company’s financial statements fairly represented Sunbeam’s results and were prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. In 2002, the SEC resolved a legal action against Andersen when a federal judge approved a $141 million settlement in the case. Andersen agreed to pay $110 million to resolve the claims without admitting fault or liability. In the end, losses to Sunbeam shareholders amounted to about $4.4 billion, with job losses of about 1,700. Questions. 1. Explain the accounting techniques used by Sunbeam to manage its earnings. 2. How did pressures for financial performance contribute to Sunbeam’s culture, where quarterly sales were manipulated to influence investors? To what extent do you believe the Andersen auditors should have considered the resulting culture in planning and executing its audit? 3. Why is it important for auditors to use analytical comparisons such as the ratios in the Sunbeam case to evaluate possible red flags that may indicate additional auditing is required? How does making such calculations enable auditors to meet their ethical obligations?


> Do you think a CPA can justify allowing the unethical behavior of a supervisor by claiming, “It’s not my job to police the behavior of others?”

> The SEC’s new rules on posting financial information on social media sites such as Twitter means that companies can now tweet their earnings in 280 characters or less. What are the problems that may arise in using a social media platform to report key fi

> Assume that a CFO asks you, as the accountant for the company, to omit certain financial figures from the balance sheet that may paint the business in a bad light. Because the request does not involve a direct manipulation of numbers or records, would yo

> One morning a student telephones her professor that she won't be able to take a scheduled exam because her car broke down on the way home from an out-of-town trip. She asks to take it at another time. What would you do if you were the professor and why?

> Do you think the "Resolution of Ethical Issues" section in The IMA Statement of Ethical Professional Practice is a helpful part of its ethical standards?

> Why do you think good people sometimes do bad things? Explain.

> MacIntyre, in his account of Aristotelian virtue, states that integrity is the one trait of character that encompasses all the others. How does this relate to the Principles in the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct?

> Explain the components of Burchard’s Ethical Dissonance Model and how it describes the ethical person-organization fit at various stages of the contractual relationship in each potential fit scenario. Assume a Low Organizational Ethics, High Individual E

> What does the term "civility" mean to you? Do you think it is civil behavior to shout down a speaker with whom you do not agree? What about cancelling someone because you don't agree with their message?

> Answer the following with regard to egoism. (a) Do you think it is the same to act in your own self-interest as it is to act in a selfish way? (b) Do you think “enlightened self-interest” is a contradiction in terms, or is it a valid basis for all action

> David Starr Jordan (1851–1931), an educator and writer, said, “Wisdom is knowing what to do next; virtue is doing it.” Explain the meaning of this phrase as you see it.

> What is the comparative negligence defense? When can it shield auditors from legal liability for their actions?

> Tinseltown Construction just received a $2.6 billion contract to construct a modern football stadiumfor the L.A. Rams and San Diego Chargers at the L.A. Sports and Entertainment District. The company estimates that it will cost $1.8 billion to construct

> Describe the possible entities that may sue an auditor and the possible reasons for a lawsuit.

> Is there a difference between an error in financial statements, fraud, and negligence from a reasonable care perspective? Give examples of each of your response. How would these events affect accountants’ legal liability?

> During a particularly stimulating lecture by your accounting ethics professor on accountants’ legal liabilities, the following question was posed: Assume you are a CPA and have just been sued by a third-party for your failure to conduct a proper audit. W

> Under what circumstances might an auditor be held legally liable for negligent representation versus a fraudulent misrepresentation based on court rulings discussed in the chapter? Include in your discussion the tests for reliance on misrepresentations.

> Explain how the intent requirement of the legal principle of scienter relates to ethical standards of behavior discussed in previous chapters.

> Distinguish between the legal standards of gross negligence and fraud.

> How does auditors’ meeting public interest obligations relate to avoiding legal liability?

> How has the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affected the legal liability of accountants and auditors?

> Do you believe the standard for liability under the PSLRA better protects auditors from legal liability than the standards which existed before the Act was adopted by Congress? Explain.

> Danny Boy, a local CPA who owns a tax practice, is being investigated by the IRS for the preparation of false income tax returns for a client. The IRS alleges that the individual taxpayer/client used a substantial amount of his company’s funds for person

> Revenue recognition in the Xerox case called for determining the stand-alone selling price for each of the deliverables and using it to separate out the revenue amounts. Why do you think it is important to separate out the selling prices of each element

> What must a plaintiff assert in a Section 11 claim under the Securities Act of 1933 to properly allege an “opinion” statement is materially misleading? When might certain financial statement items constitute “opinions”?

> Distinguish between the legal standards of negligence and recklessness.

> Rule 10b-5 is a regulation created under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that targets securities fraud. Explain how the provision is applied in determining whether fraud has occurred including when earnings management is the underlying motivation

> Explain how the quality of corporate governance, risk management, and compliance systems are critical in controlling financial restatement risk within organizations.

> Explain how restatements due to operational issues can trigger restatements.

> Explain how errors in accounting and reporting can trigger restatements.

> Distinguish between big R and little r restatements. What is required of management and the external auditors when such events occur?

> Assume the auditor has determined that prior financial statements need to be restated. What disclosures and other information should be communicated to shareholders, investors, and creditors about this matter?

> It has been said that “Businesses don’t fail – Leaders do.” Explain what this means.

> When should financial statements be restated?

> What is the purpose of using financial analysis to spot earnings management?

> Assume you are asked in an interview: Give me one word that describes you best? Then, explain why it is important in effective leadership. What would you say?

> Describe the role of professional judgment in ethical leadership as it pertains to accountants and auditors and the link to their moral role in society.

> On August 15, 2017, the SEC completed an Administrative Hearing process initiated by a PCAOB investigation of KPMG, LLP and one of their audit partners John Riordan, CPA1 for conducting a materially deficient audit of Miller Energy Resources Inc. KPMG be

> Billy Muldoon, CPA and CFO, just finished reading a preliminary draft of his company’s annual audit report from Local CPAs, LLC. He was concerned that the CPA firm plans to issue a qualified audit report because it had concluded that the company had a ma

> Alexion is a global biopharmaceutical company whose shares are traded on the Nasdaq Stock Market in the U.S. The company develops and sells drugs for patients with life-threatening rare and ultra-rare diseases. Alexion began commercial sales of its first

> When financial results aren’t what they seemed to be – and a company is forced to issue material financial restatements –should it be required to develop policies to claw back incentive pay and bonuses that were awarded to senior managers on the basis of

> Kay & Lee LLP was retained as the auditor for Holligan Industries to audit the financial statements required by prospective banks as a prerequisite to extending a loan to the client. The auditor knows whichever bank lends money to the client is likely to

> On December 13, 2012, Vertical Pharmaceuticals Inc. and an affiliated company sued Deloitte & Touche LLP in New Jersey state court for alleged accountant malpractice, claiming the firm’s false accusations of fraudulent conduct scrapped Trigen Laboratorie

> In the 2007 case of Paul V. Anjoorian v. Arnold Kilberg & Co., Arnold Kilberg, and Pascarella & Trench, the Rhode Island Superior Court ruled that a shareholder can sue a company’s outside accounting firm for alleged negligence in the preparation of the

> QSGI, Inc., is in the business of purchasing, refurbishing, selling, and servicing used computer equipment, parts, and mainframes. During its 2008 fiscal year (FY) and continuing up to its filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 2, 2009 (the “relevant p

> Joker & Wild LLC has just been sued by its audit client, Canasta, Inc., claiming the audit failed to be conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, lacked the requisite care expected in an audit, and failed to point out that inter

> Helen Roberts is reviewing two transactions recorded by her client, Biotechnologies (Biotech), as part of her accounting firm’s annual audit of the client for the December 31, 2021, financial statements. She knows Biotech is under pressure to maximize re

> Your tax client, Steve Michaels, told you that his former accountant who prepared his annual tax returns made errors that resulted in him suffering more than $100,000 in losses. Apparently, the errors involved adjustments to his income for a loss resulti

> In Chapter 4 we discussed the artificial tax shelter arrangements developed by KPMG LLP for wealthy clients that led to the settlement of a legal action with the Department of Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. On August 29, 2005, KPMG admitted t

> On March 4, 2009, the SEC reached an agreement with Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., and issued a cease-and-desist order to settle charges that the company fraudulently inflated or otherwise misrepresented its earnings for the fourth quarter of its FY2003 a

> What are financial statement restatements?

> On June 12, 2017, GE announced that 30-year GE veteran and current President and CEO of GE Healthcare John Flannery would be replacing Jeff Immelt as CEO of the company as of August 1, 2017. Immelt had been the CEO for 16 years, taking over that role fro

> The Kraft Heinz Co. case was discussed in the chapter. To refresh your memory, on May 6, 2019, Kraft Heinz disclosed that it would restate its financial statements due to faulty procurement practices. The financial statements for 2016, 2017, and the firs

> Monsanto is an agricultural seed and chemical company that manufactures and sells glyphosate, an herbicide, under the trade name “Roundup.” Roundup historically was one of Monsanto’s most profitable products, and the company sells it to both retailers an

> Jeremy Strong, CPA was recently hired as the new CFO of Imageware Consolidated (IC) a small publicly owned company. This is Jeremy’s first job outside of public accounting, leaving Deloitte after ten years, where he rose in the ranks to senior audit and

> Meredith Merriweather, CPA is the CFO of Trego Bikes and Trikes (TBT), a manufacturer of Bicycles ranging from tricycles to high end racing bikes. The company has good market penetration and has seen a very stable demand for its bikes over the last few y

> The story of Theranos, a company that sought to make blood tests cheaper, is a cautionary tale for Silicon Valley about what can happen when a company fails to develop internal control systems or overrides them, and when the CEO creates a psychological c

> You just became the new external auditor of a large public company that carries freight throughout the world. You just began to audit the 2021 financial statements and have come across a transaction that occurred in 2020 that would materially change the

> The North Face, Inc. (North Face) is an American outdoor product company specializing in outerwear, fleece, coats, shirts, footwear, and equipment such as backpacks, tents, and sleeping bags. North Face sells clothing and equipment lines catered toward w

> The SEC bought an action against BMW NA for inaccurate disclosures of its retail vehicle sales volume in the United States. In order to close the gap between actual retail sales volume and internal retail sales targets, and in an effort to publicly maint

> According to an October 16, 2017, article by Richard Clough of Bloomberg News,1 General Electric reported earnings per share of $.28, $.13, $.19 and $.15 for the quarter ending September 30, 2017, on an earnings call. Yes, you read that correctly, GE rep

> What is the risk of management bias for each earnings judgment and estimate? What safeguards should be in place to mitigate the risk of management bias, if any? What is the external auditor’s role in this process?

> It took a long time but the Securities and Exchange Commission finally acted and held auditors responsible for the fraud that occurred in banks during the financial recession in 2014. Surprisingly to some, the TierOne bank case explained below was the na

> It’s no fun accepting a position for your dream job and then red flags are raised that make you wonder about the culture of the company. Those are the thoughts of Donna Mason on January 18, 2022, as she prepares for a meeting with her a

> The CFO, King Bernard, of Blackswan Petfood, a large publicly traded manufacturer of organic gourmet dog and cat food, is getting ready for the quarterly conference call with major investors and financial analysts in two days. The King has been reviewing

> Exhibit 1 presents the fourth quarter press release of Allergan. Allergan is a global pharmaceutical company and a leader in a new industry model – Growth Pharma. Allergan’s product lines include Botox, Juvederm, Latis

> We can’t recognize revenue immediately, Paul, since we agreed to buy similar software from DSS,” Sarah Young stated. “That’s ridiculous,” Paul Henley replied. &acir

> Winners & Losers, Inc. (WLI) is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Las Vegas. Its business model is to provide electronic sports betting in conjunction with a new law that legalized it in Nevada. The companyâ€&#15

> Weatherford International PLC is a multinational Irish public limited company based in Switzerland, with U.S. offices in Houston, Texas. Weatherford’s shares are registered with the SEC and are listed on the NYSE. Weatherford files peri

> Ronnie Maloney, an audit partner for Forrester and Loomis, a registered public accounting firm in Boston, just received a meeting request from Jack McDuff, the chairman of the audit committee of Digital Solutions, one of his clients. The audit committee

> Diamond Foods, based in Stockton, California, is a premium snack food and culinary nut company with diversified operations. The company had a reputation of making bold and expensive acquisitions. Due to competition within the snack food industry, Diamond

> Maines and Wahlen state in their research paper on the reliability of accounting information: “Accrual estimates require judgment and discretion, which some firms under certain incentive conditions will exploit to report non-neutral accruals estimates wi

> In what some are suggesting is the worst financial reporting fraud since Enron, Wirecard filed for bankruptcy in June of 2020 after admitting that €1.9 billion Euros ($2.1bn U.S.) on its balance sheet (representing roughly 25% of its total assets) probab

> Travis McGee, a Senior Audit Manager for a Big Four Audit, Consulting, Tax and Data Analytics organization, has just spent the last year helping the firm rollout its new Artificial Intelligence (AI) based audit infrastructure. Travis is considered one of

> On January 30, 2018, General Electric (GE) announced that it was taking an after-tax charge of $6.2 billion in the December 31, 2017 financial statements and additional cash funding of $15 billion in statutory capital contributions to its insurance subsi

> Margaret Dairy is a CPA and the managing partner of Dairy and Cheese, a regional CPA firm located in northwest Wisconsin. She just left a meeting with a well-respected regional credit union headquartered in her hometown. Margaret was asked whether her fi

> Richard Lange, CPA, is a sole practitioner. The largest audit client in his office is Echo Park Sportswear (EP Sports). EP Sports is a privately owned company in South Bend, Indiana with a 12-person board of directors. Richard was hired by the audit comm

> Assume Ethan Lester and Vick Jensen are CPAs. Ethan was seen as a “model employee” who deserved a promotion to director of accounting, according to Kelly Fostermann, the CEO of Fostermann Corporation, a Maryland-based, largely privately held company that

> PwC violated SEC rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-X and PCAOB Rule 3525 by engaging in improper professional conduct in violation of the independence rules on audit clients. This case is unique because the firm had mischaracterized certain nonaudit services

> On September 10, 2019, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) censured Marcum LLP and Alfonse Gregory on the basis of its findings that Marcum repeatedly violated PCAOB rules and standards over the course of four years by failing to satisf

> When Karen Ward started at Ernst & Young in 2013, only four senior managers in her division were women. All the partners were men. This was a red flag, but she didn’t see it then but soon realized that EY’s lack of female leaders was no accident but the

> Joe Kang is an owner and audit partner of Han, Kang & Lee, LLC. As the audit of Frost Systems was reaching its concluding stages on January 15, 2022, Kang met with Kate Boller, the CFO, who is also a CPA, to discuss the inventory valuation of one its hig

> Do you agree with Thomas McKee's conception of earnings management as applied to (a) operational earnings management and (b) accounting earnings management?

> Katy Carmichael, CPA, was just promoted to audit manager in the technology sector at a large public accounting firm. She started at the firm six years ago and has worked on a number of the same client audits for multiple years. She prefers being placed o

> Family Games, Inc., is a privately owned company with annual sales from a variety of wholesome electronic games that are designed for use by the entire family. The company sees itself as family-oriented and with a mission to serve the public. However, du

> Lance Popperson woke up in a sweat, with an anxiety attack coming on. Popperson popped two anti-anxiety pills, laid down to try and sleep for the third time that night, and thought once again about his dilemma. Popperson is an associate with the accounti

> In the first three months of 2021, Johnson Pharmaceutical’s sales and earnings were declining, placing the company in financial distress. As a result, Johnson had begun the process of borrowing $1 million to stay afloat. Around the same time, Paul Leona

> Jerry Maloney, CPA has been working at Mason Pharmaceuticals for fifteen years. Mason is a Fortune 1000 company whose stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange. He came to Mason after starting his career in the audit practice of PwC working on clients

> In 2005, Tony Menendez, a former Ernst & Young LLP auditor and Director of Technical Accounting and Research Training for Halliburton, blew the whistle on Halliburton’s accounting practices. The fight cost him nine years of his life. Just a few months la

> On September 8, 2016, Wells Fargo announced it was paying $185 million in fines to Los Angeles city and federal regulators to settle allegations that its employees created millions of fake bank accounts for customers. It also agreed to pay $142 million i

> John Stanton, CPA, is a seasoned accountant who left his Big-4 CPA firm Senior Manager position to become the CFO of a highly successful hundred million-dollar publicly-held manufacturer of solar panels. The company wanted John’s expertise in the renewab

> What possessed a CEO to hype a product that didn’t work and lie to financial institutions, pharmacies, the government, and the public about it? Is it hubris; plain and simple? Or was there something nefarious going on? The case of Theranos, an once high-

> What prompted partners at KPMG to facilitate cheating on internal training exams? In 2018, Timothy Daly, a former lead engagement partner, solicited and received questions and answers to the examination from a colleague, who was a second audit partner on

> Needles talks about the use of a continuum ranging from questionable or highly conservative to fraud to assess the amount to be recorded from for an estimated expense. Do you believe that the choice of an overly conservative or overly aggressive amount w

> Leaving home for the first time and going off to college is an exciting and stressful time for tens of thousands of students across the U.S. each year. Leaving the familiarity of family, friends and community behind and entering an often much more divers

> “I’m sorry, Jen. That’s the client's position,” Travis said. “I just don’t know if I can go along with it, Travis,” Jen replied. “I know. I agree with you. But, Chefs Delight is our biggest client, Jen. They’ve warned us that they will put the engagemen

> You are the Controller for Mountain Manufacturing which produces specialized components used in the manufacturing of cell phones sold by Apple, Motorola, and Samsung. The company is located in Southglenn Colorado, a suburb of Denver. Demand for your prod

> Jenna was irritated after class today. A classmate, Ben, had argued about the need for social justice reform that included defunding the police. Jenna was offended by the comments in part because her father was a policeman. She spoke to others in her cir

> Cleveland Custom Cabinets is a specialty cabinet manufacturer for high-end homes in the Cleveland Heights and Shaker Heights areas. The company manufactures cabinets built to the specifications of homeowners and employs 125 custom cabinetmakers and insta

> Section 179 of the IRS tax code allows qualifying businesses to deduct the full cost of “eligible property” on their income taxes as an expense, rather than requiring the cost of the property to be capitalized and depreciated over its useful life. The pr

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