2.99 See Answer

Question: Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a

Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a greater focus on evaluating ethical culture as part of their regulatory examination of a bank’s health. In a February 2015 speech, Thomas Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced that the Federal Reserve was making ethical culture a priority for financial services in its efforts to prevent the bad behavior among some in the financial services industry preceding the financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008.1 While acknowledging that organizations with the strongest ethical culture may have periodic episodes of bad behavior, Baxter argued that strengthening ethical culture of financial services institutions ought to lower the extent of bad behavior previously observed. Soon after this speech, a February 1, 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal described challenges large banks might have in measuring a bank’s culture, which might extend from the teller serving customers in a single branch to the senior executive C-suite.2 In particular, the article featured how Wells Fargo was surveying employees annually to measure their satisfaction, which the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf, referred to as the “happy to grumpy ratio.”This was based on the bank’s theory that happier employees are more likely to make ethical decisions. The Wall Street Journal article went on to highlight how the ratio of satisfied to not-satisfied employees improved for Wells Fargo from 3.8:1 in 2010 to 8:1 in 2014. SOMETHING WENT AWRY Ironically, just three months later, the Office of the Los Angeles, California City Attorney filed a Complaint3 in May 2015 againstWells Fargo alleging the bank was engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent sales practices by opening banking and financial accounts, products and services for California customers without their consent. The Complaint alleged that the bank was victimizing its customers by engaging in improper sales practices that allowed those employees to achieve sales goals and incentives, including incentive-based compensation. According to the Complaint, employees were encouraged to sell customers multiple banking products, which Wells Fargo referred to as “solutions.” Unfortunately, the sales quotas were unrealistic, which drove employees to engage in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices to meet their goal of selling a high number of “solutions” to each customer. The Complaint went on to allege that the bank knew about and even encouraged these practices for years and did little to discourage this behavior or to inform affected customers. That Complaint helped to trigger an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). By September 2016, the CFPB issued a Consent Order4 alleging thatWells Fargo employees were found to have opened deposit accounts between May 2011 and July 2015 without customers’ knowledge or consent and then transferred funds from those consumers’ already existing accounts to temporarily fund the unauthorized accounts long enough for the employee to meet the sales incentive goals. Additionally, employees opened credit card accounts, enrolled customers in online banking services, and requested debit cards all without customer knowledge. Those activities gave the employees credit for opening new accounts that generated additional incentive-based compensation for them. According to the Complaint filed by the City of Los Angeles, the bank put unrelenting pressure on its bankers to open numerous accounts per customer.Wells Fargo enforced its sales quotas by constant monitoring. The Complaint described how daily sales for each branch, and each sales employee, were reported and discussed by the bank’s District Managers four times a day, at 11:00 am, 1:00 pm, 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm. Employees who did not reach their goals often had to work hours beyond their typical day without being compensated or they were threatened with termination. But the quotas were often unattainable given there were simply not enough customers who entered the branch on a daily basis for employees to meet their sales goals through normal means. Those employees who failed to meet daily sales quotas were approached by management and often reprimanded or told to “do whatever it takes” to meet their individual sales quotas. The Complaint noted that several techniques were used to game the system:  Sandbagging – this refers to the bank’s practice of failing to open accounts when requested by customers, and instead, accumulating a number of account applications to be opened at a later date in the next sales period.  Pinning – this refers to the bank’s practice of assigning, without customer authorization, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to customer ATM card numbers with the intention of impersonating customers on the bank’s computers, and enrolling those customers in online banking and online bill paying without their consent.  Bundling – this refers to the bank’s practice of incorrectly informing customers that certain products were only available in packages with other products, such as additional accounts, insurance, annuities, and retirement plans. According to the CFPB Consent Order, over 1.5 million deposit accounts were opened without being authorized by customers. Of those, about 85,000 generated approximately $2 million in customer fees from overdraft charges on linked accounts the customers already had, or they arose from monthly service charges triggered by failure to keep the minimum required balances in the unauthorized accounts. Additionally, the CFPB reported that employees opened over 500,000 credit-card accounts without customer knowledge or approvals. Of those, about 14,000 accounts triggered over $400,000 for annual fees for the card and over-draft protection fees. The CFPB ordered the bank to set aside a minimum of $5 million to repay affected customers for the unauthorized fees. The CFPB also noted that the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo was ultimately responsible for the proper and sound management of the bank and the Board would need to require timely and appropriate corrective action. Most notably, the CFPB ordered that the bank pay a civil monetary penalty of $100 million to the CFPB. At the same time, the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement5 with the bank that ordered the bank to pay additional civil penalties of $50 million to the city. Simultaneously, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined the bank $35 million. So, in total the bank was fined $185 million for practices that generated less than $3 million in unauthorized fees. Apparently, leaders within the bank became aware of these practices among branch level employees before the Complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles. Between 2013 and 2015, the bank fired 5,300 employees for these inappropriate practices. At the time, the bank employed over 270,000 individuals. THE AFTERMATH Soon after the settlements were announced in early September 2016, the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf defended the bank’s efforts to stop the behavior and he called the conduct “not acceptable.” Stumpf claimed there was “no incentive to do bad things” and that the employees involved did not honor the bank’s culture.6 In a September 20, 2016 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Stumpf apologized for the bank’s failure to fulfill its responsibility to its customers, team members, and the American public and for not doing more sooner to address the cause of this unacceptable behavior. He noted that wrongful sales practice behavior was counter to the bank’s values, ethics, and culture and he defended bank management by asserting that there was no orchestrated effort or scheme that directed employees to engage in this behavior.7 Press reports noted that both Republican and Democratic Senators grilled Stumpf over the sales practices. Some suggested that the bank could have been better prepared and that Stumpf and other executives failed to answer a number of questions. The week following the hearing, Senate Democrats pressured Stumpf to answer dozens of questions to clarify and supplement his testimony given his inability to answer them at the Committee hearing. The Senators pushed for more details on the timeframe and scope of wrongdoing. In particular, they asked how he was confident that this type of fraudulent behavior did not exist in other business lines at Wells.8 Two weeks later, Wells Fargo announced that Stump was stepping down from both his role as Chairman and CEO, effectively immediately. At the end of October 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat – Massachusetts), Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat – Vermont), Senator Mazie Hirono (Democrat - Hawaii) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat - Massachusetts) issued a letter9 to Lynne Doughtie, Chairman and CEO of KPMG that contained a number of questions for the firm to answer by November 28, 2016. This letter is reproduced on the pages that follow.
Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a greater focus on evaluating ethical culture as part of their regulatory examination of a bank’s health. In a February 2015 speech, Thomas Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced that the Federal Reserve was making ethical culture a priority for financial services in its efforts to prevent the bad behavior among some in the financial services industry preceding the financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008.1 While acknowledging that organizations with the strongest ethical culture may have periodic episodes of bad behavior, Baxter argued that strengthening ethical culture of financial services institutions ought to lower the extent of bad behavior previously observed.
Soon after this speech, a February 1, 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal described challenges large banks might have in measuring a bank’s culture, which might extend from the teller serving customers in a single branch to the senior executive C-suite.2 In particular, the article featured how Wells Fargo was surveying employees annually to measure their satisfaction, which the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf, referred to as the “happy to grumpy ratio.”This was based on the bank’s theory that happier employees are more likely to make ethical decisions. The Wall Street Journal article went on to highlight how the ratio of satisfied to not-satisfied employees improved for Wells Fargo from 3.8:1 in 2010 to 8:1 in 2014.
SOMETHING WENT AWRY
Ironically, just three months later, the Office of the Los Angeles, California City Attorney filed a Complaint3 in May 2015 againstWells Fargo alleging the bank was engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent sales practices by opening banking and financial accounts, products and services for California customers without their consent. The Complaint alleged that the bank was victimizing its customers by engaging in improper sales practices that allowed those employees to achieve sales goals and incentives, including incentive-based compensation.
According to the Complaint, employees were encouraged to sell customers multiple banking products, which Wells Fargo referred to as “solutions.” Unfortunately, the sales quotas were unrealistic, which drove employees to engage in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices to meet their goal of selling a high number of “solutions” to each customer. The Complaint went on to allege that the bank knew about and even encouraged these practices for years and did little to discourage this behavior or to inform affected customers.
That Complaint helped to trigger an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). By September 2016, the CFPB issued a Consent Order4 alleging thatWells Fargo employees were found to have opened deposit accounts between May 2011 and July 2015 without customers’ knowledge or consent and then transferred funds from those consumers’ already existing accounts to temporarily fund the unauthorized accounts long enough for the employee to meet the sales incentive goals. Additionally, employees opened credit card accounts, enrolled customers in online banking services, and requested debit cards all without customer knowledge. Those activities gave the employees credit for opening new accounts that generated additional incentive-based compensation for them.
According to the Complaint filed by the City of Los Angeles, the bank put unrelenting pressure on its bankers to open numerous accounts per customer.Wells Fargo enforced its sales quotas by constant monitoring. The Complaint described how daily sales for each branch, and each sales employee, were reported and discussed by the bank’s District Managers four times a day, at 11:00 am, 1:00 pm, 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm. Employees who did not reach their goals often had to work hours beyond their typical day without being compensated or they were threatened with termination. But the quotas were often unattainable given there were simply not enough customers who entered the branch on a daily basis for employees to meet their sales goals through normal means.
Those employees who failed to meet daily sales quotas were approached by management and often reprimanded or told to “do whatever it takes” to meet their individual sales quotas. The Complaint noted that several techniques were used to game the system:
 Sandbagging – this refers to the bank’s practice of failing to open accounts when requested by customers, and instead, accumulating a number of account applications to be opened at a later date in the next sales period.
 Pinning – this refers to the bank’s practice of assigning, without customer authorization, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to customer ATM card numbers with the intention of impersonating customers on the bank’s computers, and enrolling those customers in online banking and online bill paying without their consent.
 Bundling – this refers to the bank’s practice of incorrectly informing customers that certain products were only available in packages with other products, such as additional accounts, insurance, annuities, and retirement plans.
According to the CFPB Consent Order, over 1.5 million deposit accounts were opened without being authorized by customers. Of those, about 85,000 generated approximately $2 million in customer fees from overdraft charges on linked accounts the customers already had, or they arose from monthly service charges triggered by failure to keep the minimum required balances in the unauthorized accounts. Additionally, the CFPB reported that employees opened over 500,000 credit-card accounts without customer knowledge or approvals. Of those, about 14,000 accounts triggered over $400,000 for annual fees for the card and over-draft protection fees.
The CFPB ordered the bank to set aside a minimum of $5 million to repay affected customers for the unauthorized fees. The CFPB also noted that the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo was ultimately responsible for the proper and sound management of the bank and the Board would need to require timely and appropriate corrective action. Most notably, the CFPB ordered that the bank pay a civil monetary penalty of $100 million to the CFPB.
At the same time, the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement5 with the bank that ordered the bank to pay additional civil penalties of $50 million to the city. Simultaneously, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined the bank $35 million. So, in total the bank was fined $185 million for practices that generated less than $3 million in unauthorized fees.
Apparently, leaders within the bank became aware of these practices among branch level employees before the Complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles. Between 2013 and 2015, the bank fired 5,300 employees for these inappropriate practices. At the time, the bank employed over 270,000 individuals.
THE AFTERMATH
Soon after the settlements were announced in early September 2016, the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf defended the bank’s efforts to stop the behavior and he called the conduct “not acceptable.” Stumpf claimed there was “no incentive to do bad things” and that the employees involved did not honor the bank’s culture.6
In a September 20, 2016 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Stumpf apologized for the bank’s failure to fulfill its responsibility to its customers, team members, and the American public and for not doing more sooner to address the cause of this unacceptable behavior. He noted that wrongful sales practice behavior was counter to the bank’s values, ethics, and culture and he defended bank management by asserting that there was no orchestrated effort or scheme that directed employees to engage in this behavior.7
Press reports noted that both Republican and Democratic Senators grilled Stumpf over the sales practices. Some suggested that the bank could have been better prepared and that Stumpf and other executives failed to answer a number of questions. The week following the hearing, Senate Democrats pressured Stumpf to answer dozens of questions to clarify and supplement his testimony given his inability to answer them at the Committee hearing. The Senators pushed for more details on the timeframe and scope of wrongdoing. In particular, they asked how he was confident that this type of fraudulent behavior did not exist in other business lines at Wells.8 Two weeks later, Wells Fargo announced that Stump was stepping down from both his role as Chairman and CEO, effectively immediately.
At the end of October 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat – Massachusetts), Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat – Vermont), Senator Mazie Hirono (Democrat - Hawaii) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat - Massachusetts) issued a letter9 to Lynne Doughtie, Chairman and CEO of KPMG that contained a number of questions for the firm to answer by November 28, 2016. This letter is reproduced on the pages that follow.
REQUIRED 
[1] Describe the impact of this event on Wells Fargo’s financial statements; specifically how the alleged inappropriate sales practices would have affected Wells Fargo performance and financial position in the 2011 through 2014 time period. Identify where the $185 million in fines was reflected in Wells Fargo’s 2016 financial statements.
[2] Visit the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and locate the Form 10-K filed on February 25, 2015 by Wells Fargo & Company/MN (CIK#: 0000072971) for the 2014 fiscal year (Note: The financial statements are contained in the link to Exhibit 13 of that 10-K filing). Based on that financial information filed with the SEC just prior to the first public announcement of the alleged sales improprieties, assess the following:
[a] Would the cumulative effect of the inappropriate recording of customer fees be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements for 2014?
[b] Would the $185 million fines be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements?
[3] Because Wells Fargo is a publicly traded company, KPMG would have performed the audit of the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting using PCAOB Auditing Standards. Research those standards (visit www.pcaobus.org) to answer the following questions:
[a] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud?
[b] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect an illegal act?
[4] In their letter to the KPMG CEO, the four Senators refer to the sales practices as representing a “massive fraud.” Discuss whether or not you agree with their claim.
[5] How would knowledge of the alleged sales practices shed insights about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting?
[6] Would the alleged sales practices be considered a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting?
[7] KPMG issued an audit opinion stating that Wells Fargo’s internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of December 31, 2014. Had KPMG known about the alleged sales practices before they issued their audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting for the 2014 fiscal period, how might that knowledge impact their audit opinion?
[8] Because the letter from the four Senators is a public document accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, the response from KPMG would need to be carefully crafted. If you were in Lynne Doughtie’s position, would you respond to the letter from the Senators? If so, what would be some of the challenges in crafting your response?
[9] How might information about the $185 million settlement with the CFPB, City of Los Angeles, and the OCC trigger additional issues for the bank? What implications might that have for the 2016 and beyond financial statements for Wells Fargo?


Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a greater focus on evaluating ethical culture as part of their regulatory examination of a bank’s health. In a February 2015 speech, Thomas Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced that the Federal Reserve was making ethical culture a priority for financial services in its efforts to prevent the bad behavior among some in the financial services industry preceding the financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008.1 While acknowledging that organizations with the strongest ethical culture may have periodic episodes of bad behavior, Baxter argued that strengthening ethical culture of financial services institutions ought to lower the extent of bad behavior previously observed.
Soon after this speech, a February 1, 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal described challenges large banks might have in measuring a bank’s culture, which might extend from the teller serving customers in a single branch to the senior executive C-suite.2 In particular, the article featured how Wells Fargo was surveying employees annually to measure their satisfaction, which the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf, referred to as the “happy to grumpy ratio.”This was based on the bank’s theory that happier employees are more likely to make ethical decisions. The Wall Street Journal article went on to highlight how the ratio of satisfied to not-satisfied employees improved for Wells Fargo from 3.8:1 in 2010 to 8:1 in 2014.
SOMETHING WENT AWRY
Ironically, just three months later, the Office of the Los Angeles, California City Attorney filed a Complaint3 in May 2015 againstWells Fargo alleging the bank was engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent sales practices by opening banking and financial accounts, products and services for California customers without their consent. The Complaint alleged that the bank was victimizing its customers by engaging in improper sales practices that allowed those employees to achieve sales goals and incentives, including incentive-based compensation.
According to the Complaint, employees were encouraged to sell customers multiple banking products, which Wells Fargo referred to as “solutions.” Unfortunately, the sales quotas were unrealistic, which drove employees to engage in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices to meet their goal of selling a high number of “solutions” to each customer. The Complaint went on to allege that the bank knew about and even encouraged these practices for years and did little to discourage this behavior or to inform affected customers.
That Complaint helped to trigger an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). By September 2016, the CFPB issued a Consent Order4 alleging thatWells Fargo employees were found to have opened deposit accounts between May 2011 and July 2015 without customers’ knowledge or consent and then transferred funds from those consumers’ already existing accounts to temporarily fund the unauthorized accounts long enough for the employee to meet the sales incentive goals. Additionally, employees opened credit card accounts, enrolled customers in online banking services, and requested debit cards all without customer knowledge. Those activities gave the employees credit for opening new accounts that generated additional incentive-based compensation for them.
According to the Complaint filed by the City of Los Angeles, the bank put unrelenting pressure on its bankers to open numerous accounts per customer.Wells Fargo enforced its sales quotas by constant monitoring. The Complaint described how daily sales for each branch, and each sales employee, were reported and discussed by the bank’s District Managers four times a day, at 11:00 am, 1:00 pm, 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm. Employees who did not reach their goals often had to work hours beyond their typical day without being compensated or they were threatened with termination. But the quotas were often unattainable given there were simply not enough customers who entered the branch on a daily basis for employees to meet their sales goals through normal means.
Those employees who failed to meet daily sales quotas were approached by management and often reprimanded or told to “do whatever it takes” to meet their individual sales quotas. The Complaint noted that several techniques were used to game the system:
 Sandbagging – this refers to the bank’s practice of failing to open accounts when requested by customers, and instead, accumulating a number of account applications to be opened at a later date in the next sales period.
 Pinning – this refers to the bank’s practice of assigning, without customer authorization, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to customer ATM card numbers with the intention of impersonating customers on the bank’s computers, and enrolling those customers in online banking and online bill paying without their consent.
 Bundling – this refers to the bank’s practice of incorrectly informing customers that certain products were only available in packages with other products, such as additional accounts, insurance, annuities, and retirement plans.
According to the CFPB Consent Order, over 1.5 million deposit accounts were opened without being authorized by customers. Of those, about 85,000 generated approximately $2 million in customer fees from overdraft charges on linked accounts the customers already had, or they arose from monthly service charges triggered by failure to keep the minimum required balances in the unauthorized accounts. Additionally, the CFPB reported that employees opened over 500,000 credit-card accounts without customer knowledge or approvals. Of those, about 14,000 accounts triggered over $400,000 for annual fees for the card and over-draft protection fees.
The CFPB ordered the bank to set aside a minimum of $5 million to repay affected customers for the unauthorized fees. The CFPB also noted that the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo was ultimately responsible for the proper and sound management of the bank and the Board would need to require timely and appropriate corrective action. Most notably, the CFPB ordered that the bank pay a civil monetary penalty of $100 million to the CFPB.
At the same time, the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement5 with the bank that ordered the bank to pay additional civil penalties of $50 million to the city. Simultaneously, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined the bank $35 million. So, in total the bank was fined $185 million for practices that generated less than $3 million in unauthorized fees.
Apparently, leaders within the bank became aware of these practices among branch level employees before the Complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles. Between 2013 and 2015, the bank fired 5,300 employees for these inappropriate practices. At the time, the bank employed over 270,000 individuals.
THE AFTERMATH
Soon after the settlements were announced in early September 2016, the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf defended the bank’s efforts to stop the behavior and he called the conduct “not acceptable.” Stumpf claimed there was “no incentive to do bad things” and that the employees involved did not honor the bank’s culture.6
In a September 20, 2016 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Stumpf apologized for the bank’s failure to fulfill its responsibility to its customers, team members, and the American public and for not doing more sooner to address the cause of this unacceptable behavior. He noted that wrongful sales practice behavior was counter to the bank’s values, ethics, and culture and he defended bank management by asserting that there was no orchestrated effort or scheme that directed employees to engage in this behavior.7
Press reports noted that both Republican and Democratic Senators grilled Stumpf over the sales practices. Some suggested that the bank could have been better prepared and that Stumpf and other executives failed to answer a number of questions. The week following the hearing, Senate Democrats pressured Stumpf to answer dozens of questions to clarify and supplement his testimony given his inability to answer them at the Committee hearing. The Senators pushed for more details on the timeframe and scope of wrongdoing. In particular, they asked how he was confident that this type of fraudulent behavior did not exist in other business lines at Wells.8 Two weeks later, Wells Fargo announced that Stump was stepping down from both his role as Chairman and CEO, effectively immediately.
At the end of October 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat – Massachusetts), Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat – Vermont), Senator Mazie Hirono (Democrat - Hawaii) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat - Massachusetts) issued a letter9 to Lynne Doughtie, Chairman and CEO of KPMG that contained a number of questions for the firm to answer by November 28, 2016. This letter is reproduced on the pages that follow.
REQUIRED 
[1] Describe the impact of this event on Wells Fargo’s financial statements; specifically how the alleged inappropriate sales practices would have affected Wells Fargo performance and financial position in the 2011 through 2014 time period. Identify where the $185 million in fines was reflected in Wells Fargo’s 2016 financial statements.
[2] Visit the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and locate the Form 10-K filed on February 25, 2015 by Wells Fargo & Company/MN (CIK#: 0000072971) for the 2014 fiscal year (Note: The financial statements are contained in the link to Exhibit 13 of that 10-K filing). Based on that financial information filed with the SEC just prior to the first public announcement of the alleged sales improprieties, assess the following:
[a] Would the cumulative effect of the inappropriate recording of customer fees be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements for 2014?
[b] Would the $185 million fines be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements?
[3] Because Wells Fargo is a publicly traded company, KPMG would have performed the audit of the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting using PCAOB Auditing Standards. Research those standards (visit www.pcaobus.org) to answer the following questions:
[a] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud?
[b] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect an illegal act?
[4] In their letter to the KPMG CEO, the four Senators refer to the sales practices as representing a “massive fraud.” Discuss whether or not you agree with their claim.
[5] How would knowledge of the alleged sales practices shed insights about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting?
[6] Would the alleged sales practices be considered a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting?
[7] KPMG issued an audit opinion stating that Wells Fargo’s internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of December 31, 2014. Had KPMG known about the alleged sales practices before they issued their audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting for the 2014 fiscal period, how might that knowledge impact their audit opinion?
[8] Because the letter from the four Senators is a public document accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, the response from KPMG would need to be carefully crafted. If you were in Lynne Doughtie’s position, would you respond to the letter from the Senators? If so, what would be some of the challenges in crafting your response?
[9] How might information about the $185 million settlement with the CFPB, City of Los Angeles, and the OCC trigger additional issues for the bank? What implications might that have for the 2016 and beyond financial statements for Wells Fargo?


Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a greater focus on evaluating ethical culture as part of their regulatory examination of a bank’s health. In a February 2015 speech, Thomas Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced that the Federal Reserve was making ethical culture a priority for financial services in its efforts to prevent the bad behavior among some in the financial services industry preceding the financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008.1 While acknowledging that organizations with the strongest ethical culture may have periodic episodes of bad behavior, Baxter argued that strengthening ethical culture of financial services institutions ought to lower the extent of bad behavior previously observed.
Soon after this speech, a February 1, 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal described challenges large banks might have in measuring a bank’s culture, which might extend from the teller serving customers in a single branch to the senior executive C-suite.2 In particular, the article featured how Wells Fargo was surveying employees annually to measure their satisfaction, which the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf, referred to as the “happy to grumpy ratio.”This was based on the bank’s theory that happier employees are more likely to make ethical decisions. The Wall Street Journal article went on to highlight how the ratio of satisfied to not-satisfied employees improved for Wells Fargo from 3.8:1 in 2010 to 8:1 in 2014.
SOMETHING WENT AWRY
Ironically, just three months later, the Office of the Los Angeles, California City Attorney filed a Complaint3 in May 2015 againstWells Fargo alleging the bank was engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent sales practices by opening banking and financial accounts, products and services for California customers without their consent. The Complaint alleged that the bank was victimizing its customers by engaging in improper sales practices that allowed those employees to achieve sales goals and incentives, including incentive-based compensation.
According to the Complaint, employees were encouraged to sell customers multiple banking products, which Wells Fargo referred to as “solutions.” Unfortunately, the sales quotas were unrealistic, which drove employees to engage in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices to meet their goal of selling a high number of “solutions” to each customer. The Complaint went on to allege that the bank knew about and even encouraged these practices for years and did little to discourage this behavior or to inform affected customers.
That Complaint helped to trigger an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). By September 2016, the CFPB issued a Consent Order4 alleging thatWells Fargo employees were found to have opened deposit accounts between May 2011 and July 2015 without customers’ knowledge or consent and then transferred funds from those consumers’ already existing accounts to temporarily fund the unauthorized accounts long enough for the employee to meet the sales incentive goals. Additionally, employees opened credit card accounts, enrolled customers in online banking services, and requested debit cards all without customer knowledge. Those activities gave the employees credit for opening new accounts that generated additional incentive-based compensation for them.
According to the Complaint filed by the City of Los Angeles, the bank put unrelenting pressure on its bankers to open numerous accounts per customer.Wells Fargo enforced its sales quotas by constant monitoring. The Complaint described how daily sales for each branch, and each sales employee, were reported and discussed by the bank’s District Managers four times a day, at 11:00 am, 1:00 pm, 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm. Employees who did not reach their goals often had to work hours beyond their typical day without being compensated or they were threatened with termination. But the quotas were often unattainable given there were simply not enough customers who entered the branch on a daily basis for employees to meet their sales goals through normal means.
Those employees who failed to meet daily sales quotas were approached by management and often reprimanded or told to “do whatever it takes” to meet their individual sales quotas. The Complaint noted that several techniques were used to game the system:
 Sandbagging – this refers to the bank’s practice of failing to open accounts when requested by customers, and instead, accumulating a number of account applications to be opened at a later date in the next sales period.
 Pinning – this refers to the bank’s practice of assigning, without customer authorization, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to customer ATM card numbers with the intention of impersonating customers on the bank’s computers, and enrolling those customers in online banking and online bill paying without their consent.
 Bundling – this refers to the bank’s practice of incorrectly informing customers that certain products were only available in packages with other products, such as additional accounts, insurance, annuities, and retirement plans.
According to the CFPB Consent Order, over 1.5 million deposit accounts were opened without being authorized by customers. Of those, about 85,000 generated approximately $2 million in customer fees from overdraft charges on linked accounts the customers already had, or they arose from monthly service charges triggered by failure to keep the minimum required balances in the unauthorized accounts. Additionally, the CFPB reported that employees opened over 500,000 credit-card accounts without customer knowledge or approvals. Of those, about 14,000 accounts triggered over $400,000 for annual fees for the card and over-draft protection fees.
The CFPB ordered the bank to set aside a minimum of $5 million to repay affected customers for the unauthorized fees. The CFPB also noted that the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo was ultimately responsible for the proper and sound management of the bank and the Board would need to require timely and appropriate corrective action. Most notably, the CFPB ordered that the bank pay a civil monetary penalty of $100 million to the CFPB.
At the same time, the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement5 with the bank that ordered the bank to pay additional civil penalties of $50 million to the city. Simultaneously, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined the bank $35 million. So, in total the bank was fined $185 million for practices that generated less than $3 million in unauthorized fees.
Apparently, leaders within the bank became aware of these practices among branch level employees before the Complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles. Between 2013 and 2015, the bank fired 5,300 employees for these inappropriate practices. At the time, the bank employed over 270,000 individuals.
THE AFTERMATH
Soon after the settlements were announced in early September 2016, the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf defended the bank’s efforts to stop the behavior and he called the conduct “not acceptable.” Stumpf claimed there was “no incentive to do bad things” and that the employees involved did not honor the bank’s culture.6
In a September 20, 2016 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Stumpf apologized for the bank’s failure to fulfill its responsibility to its customers, team members, and the American public and for not doing more sooner to address the cause of this unacceptable behavior. He noted that wrongful sales practice behavior was counter to the bank’s values, ethics, and culture and he defended bank management by asserting that there was no orchestrated effort or scheme that directed employees to engage in this behavior.7
Press reports noted that both Republican and Democratic Senators grilled Stumpf over the sales practices. Some suggested that the bank could have been better prepared and that Stumpf and other executives failed to answer a number of questions. The week following the hearing, Senate Democrats pressured Stumpf to answer dozens of questions to clarify and supplement his testimony given his inability to answer them at the Committee hearing. The Senators pushed for more details on the timeframe and scope of wrongdoing. In particular, they asked how he was confident that this type of fraudulent behavior did not exist in other business lines at Wells.8 Two weeks later, Wells Fargo announced that Stump was stepping down from both his role as Chairman and CEO, effectively immediately.
At the end of October 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat – Massachusetts), Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat – Vermont), Senator Mazie Hirono (Democrat - Hawaii) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat - Massachusetts) issued a letter9 to Lynne Doughtie, Chairman and CEO of KPMG that contained a number of questions for the firm to answer by November 28, 2016. This letter is reproduced on the pages that follow.
REQUIRED 
[1] Describe the impact of this event on Wells Fargo’s financial statements; specifically how the alleged inappropriate sales practices would have affected Wells Fargo performance and financial position in the 2011 through 2014 time period. Identify where the $185 million in fines was reflected in Wells Fargo’s 2016 financial statements.
[2] Visit the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and locate the Form 10-K filed on February 25, 2015 by Wells Fargo & Company/MN (CIK#: 0000072971) for the 2014 fiscal year (Note: The financial statements are contained in the link to Exhibit 13 of that 10-K filing). Based on that financial information filed with the SEC just prior to the first public announcement of the alleged sales improprieties, assess the following:
[a] Would the cumulative effect of the inappropriate recording of customer fees be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements for 2014?
[b] Would the $185 million fines be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements?
[3] Because Wells Fargo is a publicly traded company, KPMG would have performed the audit of the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting using PCAOB Auditing Standards. Research those standards (visit www.pcaobus.org) to answer the following questions:
[a] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud?
[b] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect an illegal act?
[4] In their letter to the KPMG CEO, the four Senators refer to the sales practices as representing a “massive fraud.” Discuss whether or not you agree with their claim.
[5] How would knowledge of the alleged sales practices shed insights about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting?
[6] Would the alleged sales practices be considered a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting?
[7] KPMG issued an audit opinion stating that Wells Fargo’s internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of December 31, 2014. Had KPMG known about the alleged sales practices before they issued their audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting for the 2014 fiscal period, how might that knowledge impact their audit opinion?
[8] Because the letter from the four Senators is a public document accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, the response from KPMG would need to be carefully crafted. If you were in Lynne Doughtie’s position, would you respond to the letter from the Senators? If so, what would be some of the challenges in crafting your response?
[9] How might information about the $185 million settlement with the CFPB, City of Los Angeles, and the OCC trigger additional issues for the bank? What implications might that have for the 2016 and beyond financial statements for Wells Fargo?


Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a greater focus on evaluating ethical culture as part of their regulatory examination of a bank’s health. In a February 2015 speech, Thomas Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced that the Federal Reserve was making ethical culture a priority for financial services in its efforts to prevent the bad behavior among some in the financial services industry preceding the financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008.1 While acknowledging that organizations with the strongest ethical culture may have periodic episodes of bad behavior, Baxter argued that strengthening ethical culture of financial services institutions ought to lower the extent of bad behavior previously observed.
Soon after this speech, a February 1, 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal described challenges large banks might have in measuring a bank’s culture, which might extend from the teller serving customers in a single branch to the senior executive C-suite.2 In particular, the article featured how Wells Fargo was surveying employees annually to measure their satisfaction, which the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf, referred to as the “happy to grumpy ratio.”This was based on the bank’s theory that happier employees are more likely to make ethical decisions. The Wall Street Journal article went on to highlight how the ratio of satisfied to not-satisfied employees improved for Wells Fargo from 3.8:1 in 2010 to 8:1 in 2014.
SOMETHING WENT AWRY
Ironically, just three months later, the Office of the Los Angeles, California City Attorney filed a Complaint3 in May 2015 againstWells Fargo alleging the bank was engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent sales practices by opening banking and financial accounts, products and services for California customers without their consent. The Complaint alleged that the bank was victimizing its customers by engaging in improper sales practices that allowed those employees to achieve sales goals and incentives, including incentive-based compensation.
According to the Complaint, employees were encouraged to sell customers multiple banking products, which Wells Fargo referred to as “solutions.” Unfortunately, the sales quotas were unrealistic, which drove employees to engage in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices to meet their goal of selling a high number of “solutions” to each customer. The Complaint went on to allege that the bank knew about and even encouraged these practices for years and did little to discourage this behavior or to inform affected customers.
That Complaint helped to trigger an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). By September 2016, the CFPB issued a Consent Order4 alleging thatWells Fargo employees were found to have opened deposit accounts between May 2011 and July 2015 without customers’ knowledge or consent and then transferred funds from those consumers’ already existing accounts to temporarily fund the unauthorized accounts long enough for the employee to meet the sales incentive goals. Additionally, employees opened credit card accounts, enrolled customers in online banking services, and requested debit cards all without customer knowledge. Those activities gave the employees credit for opening new accounts that generated additional incentive-based compensation for them.
According to the Complaint filed by the City of Los Angeles, the bank put unrelenting pressure on its bankers to open numerous accounts per customer.Wells Fargo enforced its sales quotas by constant monitoring. The Complaint described how daily sales for each branch, and each sales employee, were reported and discussed by the bank’s District Managers four times a day, at 11:00 am, 1:00 pm, 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm. Employees who did not reach their goals often had to work hours beyond their typical day without being compensated or they were threatened with termination. But the quotas were often unattainable given there were simply not enough customers who entered the branch on a daily basis for employees to meet their sales goals through normal means.
Those employees who failed to meet daily sales quotas were approached by management and often reprimanded or told to “do whatever it takes” to meet their individual sales quotas. The Complaint noted that several techniques were used to game the system:
 Sandbagging – this refers to the bank’s practice of failing to open accounts when requested by customers, and instead, accumulating a number of account applications to be opened at a later date in the next sales period.
 Pinning – this refers to the bank’s practice of assigning, without customer authorization, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to customer ATM card numbers with the intention of impersonating customers on the bank’s computers, and enrolling those customers in online banking and online bill paying without their consent.
 Bundling – this refers to the bank’s practice of incorrectly informing customers that certain products were only available in packages with other products, such as additional accounts, insurance, annuities, and retirement plans.
According to the CFPB Consent Order, over 1.5 million deposit accounts were opened without being authorized by customers. Of those, about 85,000 generated approximately $2 million in customer fees from overdraft charges on linked accounts the customers already had, or they arose from monthly service charges triggered by failure to keep the minimum required balances in the unauthorized accounts. Additionally, the CFPB reported that employees opened over 500,000 credit-card accounts without customer knowledge or approvals. Of those, about 14,000 accounts triggered over $400,000 for annual fees for the card and over-draft protection fees.
The CFPB ordered the bank to set aside a minimum of $5 million to repay affected customers for the unauthorized fees. The CFPB also noted that the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo was ultimately responsible for the proper and sound management of the bank and the Board would need to require timely and appropriate corrective action. Most notably, the CFPB ordered that the bank pay a civil monetary penalty of $100 million to the CFPB.
At the same time, the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement5 with the bank that ordered the bank to pay additional civil penalties of $50 million to the city. Simultaneously, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined the bank $35 million. So, in total the bank was fined $185 million for practices that generated less than $3 million in unauthorized fees.
Apparently, leaders within the bank became aware of these practices among branch level employees before the Complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles. Between 2013 and 2015, the bank fired 5,300 employees for these inappropriate practices. At the time, the bank employed over 270,000 individuals.
THE AFTERMATH
Soon after the settlements were announced in early September 2016, the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf defended the bank’s efforts to stop the behavior and he called the conduct “not acceptable.” Stumpf claimed there was “no incentive to do bad things” and that the employees involved did not honor the bank’s culture.6
In a September 20, 2016 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Stumpf apologized for the bank’s failure to fulfill its responsibility to its customers, team members, and the American public and for not doing more sooner to address the cause of this unacceptable behavior. He noted that wrongful sales practice behavior was counter to the bank’s values, ethics, and culture and he defended bank management by asserting that there was no orchestrated effort or scheme that directed employees to engage in this behavior.7
Press reports noted that both Republican and Democratic Senators grilled Stumpf over the sales practices. Some suggested that the bank could have been better prepared and that Stumpf and other executives failed to answer a number of questions. The week following the hearing, Senate Democrats pressured Stumpf to answer dozens of questions to clarify and supplement his testimony given his inability to answer them at the Committee hearing. The Senators pushed for more details on the timeframe and scope of wrongdoing. In particular, they asked how he was confident that this type of fraudulent behavior did not exist in other business lines at Wells.8 Two weeks later, Wells Fargo announced that Stump was stepping down from both his role as Chairman and CEO, effectively immediately.
At the end of October 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat – Massachusetts), Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat – Vermont), Senator Mazie Hirono (Democrat - Hawaii) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat - Massachusetts) issued a letter9 to Lynne Doughtie, Chairman and CEO of KPMG that contained a number of questions for the firm to answer by November 28, 2016. This letter is reproduced on the pages that follow.
REQUIRED 
[1] Describe the impact of this event on Wells Fargo’s financial statements; specifically how the alleged inappropriate sales practices would have affected Wells Fargo performance and financial position in the 2011 through 2014 time period. Identify where the $185 million in fines was reflected in Wells Fargo’s 2016 financial statements.
[2] Visit the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and locate the Form 10-K filed on February 25, 2015 by Wells Fargo & Company/MN (CIK#: 0000072971) for the 2014 fiscal year (Note: The financial statements are contained in the link to Exhibit 13 of that 10-K filing). Based on that financial information filed with the SEC just prior to the first public announcement of the alleged sales improprieties, assess the following:
[a] Would the cumulative effect of the inappropriate recording of customer fees be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements for 2014?
[b] Would the $185 million fines be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements?
[3] Because Wells Fargo is a publicly traded company, KPMG would have performed the audit of the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting using PCAOB Auditing Standards. Research those standards (visit www.pcaobus.org) to answer the following questions:
[a] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud?
[b] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect an illegal act?
[4] In their letter to the KPMG CEO, the four Senators refer to the sales practices as representing a “massive fraud.” Discuss whether or not you agree with their claim.
[5] How would knowledge of the alleged sales practices shed insights about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting?
[6] Would the alleged sales practices be considered a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting?
[7] KPMG issued an audit opinion stating that Wells Fargo’s internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of December 31, 2014. Had KPMG known about the alleged sales practices before they issued their audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting for the 2014 fiscal period, how might that knowledge impact their audit opinion?
[8] Because the letter from the four Senators is a public document accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, the response from KPMG would need to be carefully crafted. If you were in Lynne Doughtie’s position, would you respond to the letter from the Senators? If so, what would be some of the challenges in crafting your response?
[9] How might information about the $185 million settlement with the CFPB, City of Los Angeles, and the OCC trigger additional issues for the bank? What implications might that have for the 2016 and beyond financial statements for Wells Fargo?


Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a greater focus on evaluating ethical culture as part of their regulatory examination of a bank’s health. In a February 2015 speech, Thomas Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced that the Federal Reserve was making ethical culture a priority for financial services in its efforts to prevent the bad behavior among some in the financial services industry preceding the financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008.1 While acknowledging that organizations with the strongest ethical culture may have periodic episodes of bad behavior, Baxter argued that strengthening ethical culture of financial services institutions ought to lower the extent of bad behavior previously observed.
Soon after this speech, a February 1, 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal described challenges large banks might have in measuring a bank’s culture, which might extend from the teller serving customers in a single branch to the senior executive C-suite.2 In particular, the article featured how Wells Fargo was surveying employees annually to measure their satisfaction, which the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf, referred to as the “happy to grumpy ratio.”This was based on the bank’s theory that happier employees are more likely to make ethical decisions. The Wall Street Journal article went on to highlight how the ratio of satisfied to not-satisfied employees improved for Wells Fargo from 3.8:1 in 2010 to 8:1 in 2014.
SOMETHING WENT AWRY
Ironically, just three months later, the Office of the Los Angeles, California City Attorney filed a Complaint3 in May 2015 againstWells Fargo alleging the bank was engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent sales practices by opening banking and financial accounts, products and services for California customers without their consent. The Complaint alleged that the bank was victimizing its customers by engaging in improper sales practices that allowed those employees to achieve sales goals and incentives, including incentive-based compensation.
According to the Complaint, employees were encouraged to sell customers multiple banking products, which Wells Fargo referred to as “solutions.” Unfortunately, the sales quotas were unrealistic, which drove employees to engage in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices to meet their goal of selling a high number of “solutions” to each customer. The Complaint went on to allege that the bank knew about and even encouraged these practices for years and did little to discourage this behavior or to inform affected customers.
That Complaint helped to trigger an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). By September 2016, the CFPB issued a Consent Order4 alleging thatWells Fargo employees were found to have opened deposit accounts between May 2011 and July 2015 without customers’ knowledge or consent and then transferred funds from those consumers’ already existing accounts to temporarily fund the unauthorized accounts long enough for the employee to meet the sales incentive goals. Additionally, employees opened credit card accounts, enrolled customers in online banking services, and requested debit cards all without customer knowledge. Those activities gave the employees credit for opening new accounts that generated additional incentive-based compensation for them.
According to the Complaint filed by the City of Los Angeles, the bank put unrelenting pressure on its bankers to open numerous accounts per customer.Wells Fargo enforced its sales quotas by constant monitoring. The Complaint described how daily sales for each branch, and each sales employee, were reported and discussed by the bank’s District Managers four times a day, at 11:00 am, 1:00 pm, 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm. Employees who did not reach their goals often had to work hours beyond their typical day without being compensated or they were threatened with termination. But the quotas were often unattainable given there were simply not enough customers who entered the branch on a daily basis for employees to meet their sales goals through normal means.
Those employees who failed to meet daily sales quotas were approached by management and often reprimanded or told to “do whatever it takes” to meet their individual sales quotas. The Complaint noted that several techniques were used to game the system:
 Sandbagging – this refers to the bank’s practice of failing to open accounts when requested by customers, and instead, accumulating a number of account applications to be opened at a later date in the next sales period.
 Pinning – this refers to the bank’s practice of assigning, without customer authorization, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to customer ATM card numbers with the intention of impersonating customers on the bank’s computers, and enrolling those customers in online banking and online bill paying without their consent.
 Bundling – this refers to the bank’s practice of incorrectly informing customers that certain products were only available in packages with other products, such as additional accounts, insurance, annuities, and retirement plans.
According to the CFPB Consent Order, over 1.5 million deposit accounts were opened without being authorized by customers. Of those, about 85,000 generated approximately $2 million in customer fees from overdraft charges on linked accounts the customers already had, or they arose from monthly service charges triggered by failure to keep the minimum required balances in the unauthorized accounts. Additionally, the CFPB reported that employees opened over 500,000 credit-card accounts without customer knowledge or approvals. Of those, about 14,000 accounts triggered over $400,000 for annual fees for the card and over-draft protection fees.
The CFPB ordered the bank to set aside a minimum of $5 million to repay affected customers for the unauthorized fees. The CFPB also noted that the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo was ultimately responsible for the proper and sound management of the bank and the Board would need to require timely and appropriate corrective action. Most notably, the CFPB ordered that the bank pay a civil monetary penalty of $100 million to the CFPB.
At the same time, the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement5 with the bank that ordered the bank to pay additional civil penalties of $50 million to the city. Simultaneously, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined the bank $35 million. So, in total the bank was fined $185 million for practices that generated less than $3 million in unauthorized fees.
Apparently, leaders within the bank became aware of these practices among branch level employees before the Complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles. Between 2013 and 2015, the bank fired 5,300 employees for these inappropriate practices. At the time, the bank employed over 270,000 individuals.
THE AFTERMATH
Soon after the settlements were announced in early September 2016, the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf defended the bank’s efforts to stop the behavior and he called the conduct “not acceptable.” Stumpf claimed there was “no incentive to do bad things” and that the employees involved did not honor the bank’s culture.6
In a September 20, 2016 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Stumpf apologized for the bank’s failure to fulfill its responsibility to its customers, team members, and the American public and for not doing more sooner to address the cause of this unacceptable behavior. He noted that wrongful sales practice behavior was counter to the bank’s values, ethics, and culture and he defended bank management by asserting that there was no orchestrated effort or scheme that directed employees to engage in this behavior.7
Press reports noted that both Republican and Democratic Senators grilled Stumpf over the sales practices. Some suggested that the bank could have been better prepared and that Stumpf and other executives failed to answer a number of questions. The week following the hearing, Senate Democrats pressured Stumpf to answer dozens of questions to clarify and supplement his testimony given his inability to answer them at the Committee hearing. The Senators pushed for more details on the timeframe and scope of wrongdoing. In particular, they asked how he was confident that this type of fraudulent behavior did not exist in other business lines at Wells.8 Two weeks later, Wells Fargo announced that Stump was stepping down from both his role as Chairman and CEO, effectively immediately.
At the end of October 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat – Massachusetts), Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat – Vermont), Senator Mazie Hirono (Democrat - Hawaii) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat - Massachusetts) issued a letter9 to Lynne Doughtie, Chairman and CEO of KPMG that contained a number of questions for the firm to answer by November 28, 2016. This letter is reproduced on the pages that follow.
REQUIRED 
[1] Describe the impact of this event on Wells Fargo’s financial statements; specifically how the alleged inappropriate sales practices would have affected Wells Fargo performance and financial position in the 2011 through 2014 time period. Identify where the $185 million in fines was reflected in Wells Fargo’s 2016 financial statements.
[2] Visit the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and locate the Form 10-K filed on February 25, 2015 by Wells Fargo & Company/MN (CIK#: 0000072971) for the 2014 fiscal year (Note: The financial statements are contained in the link to Exhibit 13 of that 10-K filing). Based on that financial information filed with the SEC just prior to the first public announcement of the alleged sales improprieties, assess the following:
[a] Would the cumulative effect of the inappropriate recording of customer fees be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements for 2014?
[b] Would the $185 million fines be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements?
[3] Because Wells Fargo is a publicly traded company, KPMG would have performed the audit of the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting using PCAOB Auditing Standards. Research those standards (visit www.pcaobus.org) to answer the following questions:
[a] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud?
[b] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect an illegal act?
[4] In their letter to the KPMG CEO, the four Senators refer to the sales practices as representing a “massive fraud.” Discuss whether or not you agree with their claim.
[5] How would knowledge of the alleged sales practices shed insights about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting?
[6] Would the alleged sales practices be considered a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting?
[7] KPMG issued an audit opinion stating that Wells Fargo’s internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of December 31, 2014. Had KPMG known about the alleged sales practices before they issued their audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting for the 2014 fiscal period, how might that knowledge impact their audit opinion?
[8] Because the letter from the four Senators is a public document accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, the response from KPMG would need to be carefully crafted. If you were in Lynne Doughtie’s position, would you respond to the letter from the Senators? If so, what would be some of the challenges in crafting your response?
[9] How might information about the $185 million settlement with the CFPB, City of Los Angeles, and the OCC trigger additional issues for the bank? What implications might that have for the 2016 and beyond financial statements for Wells Fargo?


Banking regulators announced in early 2015 a greater focus on evaluating ethical culture as part of their regulatory examination of a bank’s health. In a February 2015 speech, Thomas Baxter, Executive Vice President and General Counsel at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, announced that the Federal Reserve was making ethical culture a priority for financial services in its efforts to prevent the bad behavior among some in the financial services industry preceding the financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008.1 While acknowledging that organizations with the strongest ethical culture may have periodic episodes of bad behavior, Baxter argued that strengthening ethical culture of financial services institutions ought to lower the extent of bad behavior previously observed.
Soon after this speech, a February 1, 2015 article in The Wall Street Journal described challenges large banks might have in measuring a bank’s culture, which might extend from the teller serving customers in a single branch to the senior executive C-suite.2 In particular, the article featured how Wells Fargo was surveying employees annually to measure their satisfaction, which the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf, referred to as the “happy to grumpy ratio.”This was based on the bank’s theory that happier employees are more likely to make ethical decisions. The Wall Street Journal article went on to highlight how the ratio of satisfied to not-satisfied employees improved for Wells Fargo from 3.8:1 in 2010 to 8:1 in 2014.
SOMETHING WENT AWRY
Ironically, just three months later, the Office of the Los Angeles, California City Attorney filed a Complaint3 in May 2015 againstWells Fargo alleging the bank was engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent sales practices by opening banking and financial accounts, products and services for California customers without their consent. The Complaint alleged that the bank was victimizing its customers by engaging in improper sales practices that allowed those employees to achieve sales goals and incentives, including incentive-based compensation.
According to the Complaint, employees were encouraged to sell customers multiple banking products, which Wells Fargo referred to as “solutions.” Unfortunately, the sales quotas were unrealistic, which drove employees to engage in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent practices to meet their goal of selling a high number of “solutions” to each customer. The Complaint went on to allege that the bank knew about and even encouraged these practices for years and did little to discourage this behavior or to inform affected customers.
That Complaint helped to trigger an investigation by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). By September 2016, the CFPB issued a Consent Order4 alleging thatWells Fargo employees were found to have opened deposit accounts between May 2011 and July 2015 without customers’ knowledge or consent and then transferred funds from those consumers’ already existing accounts to temporarily fund the unauthorized accounts long enough for the employee to meet the sales incentive goals. Additionally, employees opened credit card accounts, enrolled customers in online banking services, and requested debit cards all without customer knowledge. Those activities gave the employees credit for opening new accounts that generated additional incentive-based compensation for them.
According to the Complaint filed by the City of Los Angeles, the bank put unrelenting pressure on its bankers to open numerous accounts per customer.Wells Fargo enforced its sales quotas by constant monitoring. The Complaint described how daily sales for each branch, and each sales employee, were reported and discussed by the bank’s District Managers four times a day, at 11:00 am, 1:00 pm, 3:00 pm and 5:00 pm. Employees who did not reach their goals often had to work hours beyond their typical day without being compensated or they were threatened with termination. But the quotas were often unattainable given there were simply not enough customers who entered the branch on a daily basis for employees to meet their sales goals through normal means.
Those employees who failed to meet daily sales quotas were approached by management and often reprimanded or told to “do whatever it takes” to meet their individual sales quotas. The Complaint noted that several techniques were used to game the system:
 Sandbagging – this refers to the bank’s practice of failing to open accounts when requested by customers, and instead, accumulating a number of account applications to be opened at a later date in the next sales period.
 Pinning – this refers to the bank’s practice of assigning, without customer authorization, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) to customer ATM card numbers with the intention of impersonating customers on the bank’s computers, and enrolling those customers in online banking and online bill paying without their consent.
 Bundling – this refers to the bank’s practice of incorrectly informing customers that certain products were only available in packages with other products, such as additional accounts, insurance, annuities, and retirement plans.
According to the CFPB Consent Order, over 1.5 million deposit accounts were opened without being authorized by customers. Of those, about 85,000 generated approximately $2 million in customer fees from overdraft charges on linked accounts the customers already had, or they arose from monthly service charges triggered by failure to keep the minimum required balances in the unauthorized accounts. Additionally, the CFPB reported that employees opened over 500,000 credit-card accounts without customer knowledge or approvals. Of those, about 14,000 accounts triggered over $400,000 for annual fees for the card and over-draft protection fees.
The CFPB ordered the bank to set aside a minimum of $5 million to repay affected customers for the unauthorized fees. The CFPB also noted that the Board of Directors of Wells Fargo was ultimately responsible for the proper and sound management of the bank and the Board would need to require timely and appropriate corrective action. Most notably, the CFPB ordered that the bank pay a civil monetary penalty of $100 million to the CFPB.
At the same time, the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement5 with the bank that ordered the bank to pay additional civil penalties of $50 million to the city. Simultaneously, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined the bank $35 million. So, in total the bank was fined $185 million for practices that generated less than $3 million in unauthorized fees.
Apparently, leaders within the bank became aware of these practices among branch level employees before the Complaint was filed by the City of Los Angeles. Between 2013 and 2015, the bank fired 5,300 employees for these inappropriate practices. At the time, the bank employed over 270,000 individuals.
THE AFTERMATH
Soon after the settlements were announced in early September 2016, the bank’s CEO, John Stumpf defended the bank’s efforts to stop the behavior and he called the conduct “not acceptable.” Stumpf claimed there was “no incentive to do bad things” and that the employees involved did not honor the bank’s culture.6
In a September 20, 2016 hearing held by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Stumpf apologized for the bank’s failure to fulfill its responsibility to its customers, team members, and the American public and for not doing more sooner to address the cause of this unacceptable behavior. He noted that wrongful sales practice behavior was counter to the bank’s values, ethics, and culture and he defended bank management by asserting that there was no orchestrated effort or scheme that directed employees to engage in this behavior.7
Press reports noted that both Republican and Democratic Senators grilled Stumpf over the sales practices. Some suggested that the bank could have been better prepared and that Stumpf and other executives failed to answer a number of questions. The week following the hearing, Senate Democrats pressured Stumpf to answer dozens of questions to clarify and supplement his testimony given his inability to answer them at the Committee hearing. The Senators pushed for more details on the timeframe and scope of wrongdoing. In particular, they asked how he was confident that this type of fraudulent behavior did not exist in other business lines at Wells.8 Two weeks later, Wells Fargo announced that Stump was stepping down from both his role as Chairman and CEO, effectively immediately.
At the end of October 2016, Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat – Massachusetts), Senator Bernie Sanders (Democrat – Vermont), Senator Mazie Hirono (Democrat - Hawaii) and Senator Edward Markey (Democrat - Massachusetts) issued a letter9 to Lynne Doughtie, Chairman and CEO of KPMG that contained a number of questions for the firm to answer by November 28, 2016. This letter is reproduced on the pages that follow.
REQUIRED 
[1] Describe the impact of this event on Wells Fargo’s financial statements; specifically how the alleged inappropriate sales practices would have affected Wells Fargo performance and financial position in the 2011 through 2014 time period. Identify where the $185 million in fines was reflected in Wells Fargo’s 2016 financial statements.
[2] Visit the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and locate the Form 10-K filed on February 25, 2015 by Wells Fargo & Company/MN (CIK#: 0000072971) for the 2014 fiscal year (Note: The financial statements are contained in the link to Exhibit 13 of that 10-K filing). Based on that financial information filed with the SEC just prior to the first public announcement of the alleged sales improprieties, assess the following:
[a] Would the cumulative effect of the inappropriate recording of customer fees be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements for 2014?
[b] Would the $185 million fines be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements?
[3] Because Wells Fargo is a publicly traded company, KPMG would have performed the audit of the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting using PCAOB Auditing Standards. Research those standards (visit www.pcaobus.org) to answer the following questions:
[a] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud?
[b] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect an illegal act?
[4] In their letter to the KPMG CEO, the four Senators refer to the sales practices as representing a “massive fraud.” Discuss whether or not you agree with their claim.
[5] How would knowledge of the alleged sales practices shed insights about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting?
[6] Would the alleged sales practices be considered a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting?
[7] KPMG issued an audit opinion stating that Wells Fargo’s internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of December 31, 2014. Had KPMG known about the alleged sales practices before they issued their audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting for the 2014 fiscal period, how might that knowledge impact their audit opinion?
[8] Because the letter from the four Senators is a public document accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, the response from KPMG would need to be carefully crafted. If you were in Lynne Doughtie’s position, would you respond to the letter from the Senators? If so, what would be some of the challenges in crafting your response?
[9] How might information about the $185 million settlement with the CFPB, City of Los Angeles, and the OCC trigger additional issues for the bank? What implications might that have for the 2016 and beyond financial statements for Wells Fargo?

REQUIRED [1] Describe the impact of this event on Wells Fargo’s financial statements; specifically how the alleged inappropriate sales practices would have affected Wells Fargo performance and financial position in the 2011 through 2014 time period. Identify where the $185 million in fines was reflected in Wells Fargo’s 2016 financial statements. [2] Visit the website of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and locate the Form 10-K filed on February 25, 2015 by Wells Fargo & Company/MN (CIK#: 0000072971) for the 2014 fiscal year (Note: The financial statements are contained in the link to Exhibit 13 of that 10-K filing). Based on that financial information filed with the SEC just prior to the first public announcement of the alleged sales improprieties, assess the following: [a] Would the cumulative effect of the inappropriate recording of customer fees be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements for 2014? [b] Would the $185 million fines be considered material to the Wells Fargo financial statements? [3] Because Wells Fargo is a publicly traded company, KPMG would have performed the audit of the financial statements and internal control over financial reporting using PCAOB Auditing Standards. Research those standards (visit www.pcaobus.org) to answer the following questions: [a] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud? [b] What is the auditor’s responsibility to detect an illegal act? [4] In their letter to the KPMG CEO, the four Senators refer to the sales practices as representing a “massive fraud.” Discuss whether or not you agree with their claim. [5] How would knowledge of the alleged sales practices shed insights about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting? [6] Would the alleged sales practices be considered a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal control over financial reporting? [7] KPMG issued an audit opinion stating that Wells Fargo’s internal controls over financial reporting were operating effectively as of December 31, 2014. Had KPMG known about the alleged sales practices before they issued their audit opinion on internal control over financial reporting for the 2014 fiscal period, how might that knowledge impact their audit opinion? [8] Because the letter from the four Senators is a public document accessible under the Freedom of Information Act, the response from KPMG would need to be carefully crafted. If you were in Lynne Doughtie’s position, would you respond to the letter from the Senators? If so, what would be some of the challenges in crafting your response? [9] How might information about the $185 million settlement with the CFPB, City of Los Angeles, and the OCC trigger additional issues for the bank? What implications might that have for the 2016 and beyond financial statements for Wells Fargo?


> Give a statement of purpose for a study to determine the favorite campus area pizza establishment.

> Refer to the data on garbage in Exercise 3.31 . (a) Plot the amount of garbage (millions of tons) versus population (millions). (b) Does there appear to be a strong correlation? Explain. (c) H ow does your interpretation of the association differ from

> The amount of municipal solid waste created has become a major problem. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, the yearly amounts (millions of tons) are: (a) Plot the amount of garbage ( millions of tons) versus year. (b) Visually, does there

> Suppose all x measurements are changed to x' = ax + b and all y measurements to y' = cy + d, where a, b, c, and d are fixed numbers (a ≠ 0, c ≠ 0). Then the correlation coefficient remains unchanged if a and c have the

> At the conclusion of one semester, a sample of 250 juniors was questioned about how long they studied for each of their final exams. Students were also classified as social, biological, or physical science majors. Compare the times studying for finals by

> Refer to concerning spurious correlation. Replace number of smartphones with per capita soda consumption in gallons. (a) Create a scatter diagram and identify the kind of association. (b) Comment on possible lurking variables.

> An ongoing study of wolves is being conducted at the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve. Table in the Data Bank gives the physical characteristics of wolves that were captured. (a) Plot length versus weight for the female wolves. From your visual ins

> An ongoing study of wolves is being conducted at the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve. Table in the Data Bank gives the physical characteristics of wolves that were captured. (a) Plot length versus weight for the male wolves. From your visual inspe

> A zoologist collected 20 wild lizards in the southwestern United States. After measuring their total length (mm), they were placed on a treadmill and their speed (m/sec) recorded. (a) Create a scatter plot. Comment on any unusual observations. (b) Calcu

> The Department of Natural Resources in Wisconsin monitors air quality in the state. Ozone is a major component of smog and high temperatures also contribute. The summer maximum daily ozone (ppm) and temperature for 23 Wednesdays during two summers are Ca

> Over the years, a traffic officer noticed that cars with fuzzy dice hanging on the rear-view mirror always seemed to be speeding. Perhaps tongue in cheek, he suggest ed that outlawing the sale of fuzzy dice would reduce the number of cars exceeding the

> What is wrong with this statement of purpose? PURPOSE: Determine if a new style wireless mouse is comfortable. Give an improved statement of purpose.

> Calculations from a data set of n = 36 pairs of ( x, y) values have provided the following results. Obtain the correlation coefficient.

> Is the correlation in Figure 9 about (a) .1, (b) .5, (c) .9, or (d) -.7?

> Match the following values of r with the correct diagrams. (a) r - .3 (b) r .l (c) r .9

> (a) Construct scatter diagrams of the data sets (b) Calculate r for the data set (i). (c) Guess the value of r for the data set (ii) and then calculate r.

> Breakfast cereals from three leading manufacturers can be classified either above average or below average in sugar content. Data for ten cereals from each manufacturer are given below: (a) Complete the marginal totals. (b) Calculate the relative freque

> Refer to the alligator data of the Data Bank. Using the data on x3 and x4 for male and female alligators from Lake Apopka: (a) Make a scatter diagram of the pairs of concentrations for the male alligators. Calculate the sample correlation coefficient.

> For the data set (a) Construct a scatter diagram. (b) Guess the sign and value of the correlation coefficient. (c) Calculate the correlation coefficient.

> If the value of r is small, can we conclude that there is not a strong relationship between the two variables?

> A new study is widely reported to show that dog owners benefit by being more agreeable and extroverted than cat owners. Comment in light of facts that, on average, dogs cost more to maintain and that dog owners have larger incomes than cat owners.

> In each of the following instances, would you expect a positive, negative, or zero correlation? (a) Number of salespersons and total dollar sales for real estate firms. (b) Total payroll and percent of wins of national league baseball teams. (c) The amou

> What is wrong with this statement of purpose? PURPOSE: Determine whether or not, over the course of the semester, the campus bus reaches your stop at the scheduled time. Give an improved statement of purpose.

> Would you expect a positive, negative, or nearly zero correlation for each of the following7 Give reasons for your answers. (a) The physical fitness of a dog and the physical fitness of the owner. (b) For each person, the number of songs downloaded fro

> With reference to the quit-smoking experiment: (a) Suppose the placebo trials were ignored and you were only told that 120 of 216 were abstinent after using the medicated patches. Would this now appear to be stronger evidence in favor of the patches? (

> With reference to the quit-smoking experiment, suppose two new subjects are available. Explain how you would assign one subject to receive the placebo and one to receive the medicated patch.

> Nausea from air sickness affects some travelers. A drug company, wanting to establish the effectiveness of its motion sickness pill, randomly gives either its pill or a look-alike sugar pill (placebo) to 200 passengers. (a) Complete the marginal totals.

> A sample of persons will each be asked to give the number of their close friends. The responses are to be grouped into the following classes: 0, 1-3, 3-5, 6 or more. Left endpoint is included. Explain where difficulties might arise.

> The number of goals your favorite ice hockey team scores are to be collected for each game. These game totals are to be grouped into the classes 0- 1, 2- 3, 4- 5, 7 or more. Both endpoints are included. Explain where a difficulty might arise.

> Data from one campus dorm on the number of burglaries are collected each week of the semester. These data are to be grouped into the classes 0-1, 2-3, 3-5, 6 or more. Both endpoints included. Explain where a difficulty might arise.

> Of the $207 million raised by a major university's fund drive, $11 7 million came from individuals and bequests, $24 million from industry and business, and $66 million from foundations and associations. Present this information in the form of a pie char

> At the last minute, 6 tickets have become available for a big football game. Use Table 1, Appendix B, to select the recipients from among 89 interested students.

> Eighty customers at a bakery named their favorite pie. The responses are as follows: (a) Calculate the frequency for each pie. (b) Construct a pie chart.

> The number of automobile accidents reported per month helps to identify intersections that require improvement. The number of crashes per month reported at an intersection near a university campus in Madison, Wisconsin, are Present these data in a freque

> A student at the University of Wisconsin surveyed 40 students in her dorm concerning their participation in extracurricular activities during the past week. The data on number of activities are Present these data in a frequency table and in a relative fr

> Recorded here are the blood types of 40 persons who have volunteered to donate blood at a plasma center. Summarize the data in a frequency table. Include calculations of the relative frequencies.

> The city of Madison regularly checks the water quality at swimming beaches located on area lakes. The concentration of fecal coliforms, in number of colony forming units (CFU) per 100 ml of water, was measured on fifteen days during the summer at one bea

> A campus area merchant recorded the number of bad checks received per month, for five months 4 5 4 7 6 Display the data in a dot diagram.

> Before microwave ovens are sold, the manufacturer must check to ensure that the radiation coming through the door is below a specified safe limit. The amounts of radiation leakage (mW/cm2) with the door closed from 25 ovens are as follows (courtesy of Jo

> A person with asthma took measurements by blowing into a peak-flow meter on seven consecutive days. 429 425 471 422 432 444 454 Display the data in a dot diagram.

> A sample of 50 departing airline passengers at the main check-in counter produced the following number of bags checked through to final destinations. (a) Make a relative frequency line diagram. (b) Comment on the pattern. (c) What proportion of passenger

> A major West Coast power company surveyed 50 customers who were asked to respond to the statement, "People should rely mainly on themselves to solve problems caused by power outages" with one of the following responses. 1. Definitely agree. 2. Somewhat

> Twelve bicycles are available for use at the student union. Use Table 1, to select 4 of them for you and three of your friends to ride today.

> A survey of 451 men revealed that 144 men, or 3 1.9%, wait until Valentine's day or the day before to purchase flowers. Identify a statistical population and the sample.

> It was 9:30 A.M. on a Monday morning when the call came through. “Hi Dr. Mitchell, do you have a minute?” “Sure,” the professor replied. “I am one of your former students, but if you don’t mind, I would prefer to remain anonymous. I think it is best for

> Nathan recently interviewed with one of the accounting firms in the city where he wants to live. The firm agreed to cover the expense of a rental car that he used to travel from his university to the firm’s office. The rental car agency required that Nat

> Brent Dorsey graduated six months ago with a master’s degree in accounting. Immediately after graduation, Brent began working with a large accounting firm in Portland, Oregon. He is now on his second audit engagement—a company called Northwest Steel Prod

> On November 15, 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed an enforcement action in the Northern Illinois U.S. District Court against Hollinger Inc., a Toronto-based company, and its former Chairman and CEO, Conrad Black, and the company’s

> Murchison Technologies, Inc. recently developed a patient-billing software system that it markets to physicians and dentists. Jim Archer and Janice Johnson founded the company in Austin, Texas five years ago after working at IBM for more than 15 years. J

> Scott glanced up at the clock on his office wall. It read 2:30 P.M. He had scheduled a 3:00 P.M. meeting with George “Hang-ten” Baldwin, chief executive officer of Surfer Dude Duds, Inc. Surfer Dude specialized in selling clothing and accessories popular

> Spencer and Loveland, LLP is a medium-sized, regional accounting firm based in the western part of the United States. A new client of the firm, K&K, Inc., which manufactures a variety of picture frames, recently contracted with Spencer and Loveland t

> Auto Parts, Inc. (“the Company”) manufactures automobile subassemblies marketed primarily to the large U.S. automakers. The publicly held Company’s unaudited financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2018, reflect total assets of $56 million,

> The information below relates to the audit of EyeMax Corporation, a client with a calendar year-end. EyeMax has debt agreements associated with publicly traded bonds that require audited financial statements. The company is currently, and historically ha

> The Runners Shop (TRS) was a family-owned business founded 17 years ago by Robert and Andrea Johnson. In July of 2018, TRS found itself experiencing a severe cash shortage that forced it to file for bankruptcy protection. Prior to shutting down its opera

> Southeast Shoe Distributor (SSD) is a closely-owned business that was founded 10 years ago by Stewart Green and Paul Williams. SSD is a distributor that purchases and resells men’s, women’s, and childrenâ€&#

> Southeast Shoe Distributor (SSD) is a closely owned business founded 10 years ago by Stewart Green and Paul Williams. SSD is a distributor that purchases and resells men’s, women’s, and children’s sho

> Southeast Shoe Distributor (SSD) is a closely owned business that was founded 10 years ago by Stewart Green and Paul Williams. SSD is a distributor that purchases and sells men’s, women’s, and childrenâ€&#15

> After being in business for only two years, Your 1040 Return.com has quickly become a leading provider of online income tax preparation and filing services for individual taxpayers. Steven Chicago founded the company after a business idea came to him whi

> Southeast Shoe Distributor (SSD) is a closely owned business that was founded 10 years ago by Stewart Green and Paul Williams. SSD is a distributor that purchases and sells men’s, women’s, and childrenâ€&#15

> Southeast Shoe Distributor (SSD) is a closely owned business that was founded ten years ago by Stewart Green and Paul Williams. SSD is a distributor that purchases and sells men’s, women’s, and childrenâ€&#1

> RedPack Beer Company is a privately-held micro brewery located in Raleigh, North Carolina. Bank loan covenants require that RedPack submit audited financial statements annually to the bank. Specifically, the bank covenants contain revenue and liquidity m

> Your audit firm, Garrett and Schulzke LLP, is engaged to perform the annual audit of Hooplah, Inc., for the year ending December 31, 2017. Hooplah is a privately-held company that sells electronics components to companies that manufacture various applian

> The Financial Accounting Standard Board’s Accounting Standards Codification Topic 820, Fair Value Measurement, (ASC 820) provides a framework for measuring or estimating the fair value of certain assets and liabilities. It provides a hierarchy with three

> Confirmations of accounts receivable play an important role in the accumulation of sufficient, appropriate audit evidence. One of the principal strengths of confirmations is that they provide evidence obtained directly from third-parties. Auditing Standa

> You couldn’t be more excited about being on your first financial statement audit as you launch into your new professional accounting career. Having recently graduated with a Master of Accountancy degree, you are thrilled to be employing all the skills ac

> Henrico Retail, Inc. is a first year audit client. The audit partner obtained the following description of the sales system after recently meeting with client personnel at the corporate office. DESCRIPTION OF THE SALES SYSTEM Henrico’s sales system is IT

> Wally’s Billboard & Sign Supply, Inc. was founded four years ago by Walter Johnson. The company specializes in providing locations for sign and billboard advertising and has recently begun to enter the sign design market. After working several years in t

> Burlingham Bees, an independent, minor league baseball team, competes in the Northwest Coast League. The team finished in second place in 2018 with a record of 94-50. The Bees’ 2018 cumulative season attendance of 534,784 spectators set

> Asher Farms, Inc. is a fully-integrated poultry processing company engaged in the production, processing, marketing and distribution of fresh and frozen chicken products.Asher Farms sells ice pack, chill pack and frozen chicken, in whole, cut-up and bone

> Northwest Bank (NWB) has banking operations in 35 communities in the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. Headquarters for the bank are in Walla Walla, Washington. NWB’s loan portfolio consists primarily of agricultural loans, comme

> Analytical procedures can be powerful tools in conducting an audit. They help the auditor understand a client’s business and are useful in identifying potential risks and problem areas requiring greater substantive audit attention. If f

> Anne Aylor, Inc. (Anne Aylor) is a leading national specialty retailer of high-quality women’s apparel, shoes, and accessories sold primarily under the “Anne Aylor” brand name. Anne Aylor is a highly

> Town and Country Hardware (T&CH) is a closely owned business founded six years ago by Caleb and Jasmine Wright. T&CH has retail hardware stores located at three lake communities along the Virginia and North Carolina border. T&CH sells products for home i

> In a management review control (MRC), members of management review key information and evaluate its reasonableness by comparing it to expected values. Some examples include comparing budget to actual, reviewing impairment analyses, and reviewing estimate

> On January 24, 2008, Société Générale, France’s second largest bank announced the largest trading loss in history, a staggering 4.9 billion Euro ($7.2 billion U.S.), which it blamed on a single rogue trader. The trader, Jérôme Kerviel, worked at what Soc

> Large public companies in the U.S. are required by law to engage an auditor to perform an “integrated audit” involving both a traditional financial statement audit and an audit of internal control over financial reporting. PCAOB Audit Standard No. 2201,

> You are the new information technology (IT) audit specialist at the accounting firm of Townsend and Townsend, LLP. One of the audit partners, Harold Mobley, asked you to evaluate the effectiveness of general and application IT-related controls for a pote

> St. James Clothiers is a high-end clothing store located in a small Tennessee town. St. James has only one store, which is located in the shopping district by the town square. St. James enjoys the reputation of being the place to buy nice clothing in the

> An entrepreneur by the name of Francisco Fernandez recently entered into a new venture involving ownership and operation of a small, 26-room motel and café. The motel is located in a remote area of southern Utah. The area is popular for tourists, who com

> Apple Inc. (Apple) is a worldwide provider of innovative technology products and services. Apple’s products and services include iPhone®, iPad®, Mac®, iPod®, Apple Watch®, Apple TV®, a portfolio of consumer and professional software applications, iOS, ma

> Tina is an audit manager with a national public accounting firm and one of her clients is Simply Steam, Co. Simply Steam provides industrial and domestic carpet steam-cleaning services. This is the first time Simply Steam has been audited. Thus, Tina doe

> John C. Koss started his first company, J.C. Koss Hospital Television Rental Company, in 1953, based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, but John had greater ambitions. Eventually he partnered with Martin Lange, an engineer, and by 1958 the two had founded Koss Ele

> In December 1995, the flamboyant entrepreneur, Michael “Mickey” Monus, formerly president and chief operating officer (COO) of the deep-discount retail chain Phar-Mor, Inc., was sentenced to 19 years and seven months in prison. Monus was convicted for th

> Xerox Corporation (Xerox), once a star in the technology sector of the economy, found itself engulfed in an accounting scandal alleging that it was too aggressive in recognizing equipment revenue.1 The complaint filed by the Securities and Exchange Commi

> Waste Management, Inc.’s Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on March 28, 1997 described the company at that time as a leading international provider of waste management services. According to disclosures i

> One can only imagine the high expectations of investors when the boards of directors of CUC International, Inc. (CUC) and HFS, Inc. (HFS) agreed to merge in May 1997 to form Cendant Corporation. The $14 billion stock merger of HFS and CUC, considered a m

> Enron Corporation entered 2001 as the seventh largest public company in the United States, only to later exit the year as the largest company to ever declare bankruptcy to that point in U.S. history. Investors who lost millions and lawmakers seeking to p

> Don’t ever tell yourself, “that won’t happen to me.” Just ask Cynthia Cooper, former Vice President of Internal Audit at WorldCom. Cynthia Cooper was a typical accounting student as an undergrad at Mississippi State University. Raised in Clinton, Mississ

> The accounting firm of Barnes and Fischer, LLP, is a medium-sized, national CPA firm. The partnership, formed in 1954, now has over 4,000 professionals on the payroll. The firm mainly provides auditing and tax services, but it has recently had success bu

> In what ways can leaders create ethical organizations?

> How do the contemporary theories of leadership relate to earlier foundational theories?

> What are the contingency theories of leadership?

> What are the causes and consequences of abuse of power?

> What power or influence tactics and their contingencies are identified most often?

> How is leadership different from power?

> The authors who suggested that membership in a team makes us smarter found that teams were more rational and quicker at finding solutions to difficult probability problems and reasoning tasks than were individuals. After participation in the study, team

> On the highly functioning teams in which you’ve been a member, what other characteristics might have contributed to success?

> From your experiences in teams, do you agree with the researchers’ findings on the characteristics of smart teams? Why or why not?

> Imagine you are a manager at a national corporation. You have been asked to select employees for a virtual problem-solving team. What types of employees would you include and why?

> Can you think of strategies that can help build trust among virtual team members?

2.99

See Answer